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In recent years there has been an increase in the amount of research critiquing international 
complex peacebuilding operations. Some of this critique is rooted in critical theory and argues 
how a universal replicated approach to peace and development, namely the liberal 
peacebuilding, possibly represents an impediment to peace itself. The liberal peacebuilding, 
which merges peacebuilding and statebuilding, is founded on a “Western” liberal agenda 
promoting political and economic liberalisation. The contemporary peacebuilding project is 
seen as given, with a specific unquestionable outcome, namely a liberal state. Furthermore, 
assumptions about the applicability of this approach, particularly in conflict areas in the 
South, are disputed.  
As regional leading states are becoming more involved in peace processes and development 
in their backyards, this study aims to investigate the peacebuilding agenda of such actors. 
South Africa has marked itself as an important actor in peacemaking and increasingly as a 
significant peacebuilding partner on the continent, through multilateral as well as bilateral 
channels. By looking at South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) from 2003 to 2008, this study aims at establishing whether South Africa, as a 
regional actor, promotes a liberal peacebuilding. This study concludes by discussing how 
there is little evidence to suggest that South Africa‟s strategy for peacebuilding in the DRC is 
differing from the liberal peacebuilding consensus. It seems evident that South Africa‟s vision 
of African solutions to African problems and an African Renaissance is in fact guided by the 
liberal peacebuilding agenda and the underlying liberal norms.   
Is it not the aim of this study to critique the intentions of peacebuilding. Rather, it is the 
assumptions about what kind of peace the liberal peacebuilding promotes that need further 
analysis. Through a critical theory approach this study goes beyond current assumptions about 
the liberal peacebuilding project and questions the foundation on which liberal peacebuilding 
is built. This study aims at challenging the ontology and epistemology of the current 
peacebuilding debate in its theoretical approach as well as its scope. The intention is to shed 
light on and establishing a basis for a better and more nuanced understanding of the nature of 






In die onlangse verlede is dit waargeneem dat daar 'n verhoging was in die hoeveelheid 
navorsing wat kritiek lewer op operasies van internasionale komplekse vredesopbou. 
Sommige van hierdie kritiek is gewortel in kritiese teorie en redeneer oor hoe 'n universele 
gerepliseerde benadering tot vrede en ontwikkeling, naamlik liberale vredesopbou, moontlik 
'n struikelblok tot vrede verteenwoordig. Liberale vredesopbou, wat vredesopbou paart met 
die bou van staat, is gegrond in 'n "Westerse" liberale agenda, wat politieke en ekonomiese 
liberalisering bevorder. Die kontemporêre vredesopbou projek word geag soos dit voor kom, 
met 'n spesifieke onbetwisbare uitkoms, naamlik „n liberale staat. Verder word daar aannames 
oor die toepaslikheid van hierdie benadering betwis, veral in gebiede van konflik in die Suid. 
Siende dat toonaangewende streeks-state meer betrokke raak in vredesontwikkeling in hul 
agterplase, stel hierdie studie ten doel om die vredesopbou agenda van sulke akteurs te 
ondersoek. Suid-Afrika het onlangs homself gemerk as „n belangrike speler in vredesbou en al 
hoe meer as 'n beduidende vredesopbou vennoot op die vasteland, deur middel van multi-
laterale asook bilaterale kanale. Deur te kyk na die vredesbou rol van Suid-Afrika in die 
Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) vanaf 2003 tot 2008, is hierdie studie gerig 
om vas te stel of Suid-Afrika, as 'n plaaslike akteur, liberale vredesopbou bevorder. Hierdie 
studie sluit af deur te bespreek hoe min bewyse daar is wat voor stel dat Suid-Afrika se 
strategie vir vredesopbou in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo verskil van die 
liberale vredesopbou konsensus. Dit dui duidelik daarop dat Suid-Afrika se visie aansiende 
Afrika-oplossings vir Afrika-probleme en 'n Afrika-renaissance in werklikheid gelei word 
deur die liberale vredesopbou agenda asook as die gepaartgaande onderliggende liberale 
norme. 
Dit is nie die doel van hierdie studie om bedoelings van vredesopbou te kritieseer nie. 
Inteendeel, dit is die aannames oor die soort van vrede wat liberale vredesopbou bevorder wat 
verdere analise benodig. Deur middel van 'n kritiese teoriebenadering gaan hierdie studie 
verder as die huidige aannames oor die liberale vredesopbou projek en vra beduidende vrae 
oor die fondamente waarop liberale Vredesopbou gebou is. Hierdie studie stel ten doel om op 
die dieontologie en epistemologie van die huidige vredesopbou debat uit te daag in sy 
teoretiesebenadering, sowel as omvang. Die bedoeling is om gelyktydig lig te werp sowel as 
„n basis vir beter en meer genuanseerde begrip te stig vir vredesopbou van die aard, deur 
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Il est plus facile de faire la guerre que la paix 
It is far easier to make war than to make peace 
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Peacebuilding rose as a multifaceted and ambitious approach to peace and development in the 
1990s. After realising the limited success of traditional peacekeeping
1
 and its impact on peace 
such as in Somalia there was a need to change the strategy; numbers showed that 50% of civil 
wars reoccurred within 5 years (Smith, 2004). More complex peacebuilding
2
 efforts were to 
create an environment conducive to peace through promoting democracy, good governance, a 
market economy and human security. The issue of development as such became a part of the 
conflict discourse and agenda (Duffield, 2001: 1).  
 
Conflict and instability as a clear impediment for peace and development has gained 
extensive attention from international as well as regional actors in mediation, negotiation and 
peace operations
3
 in the last decade. After the end of the Cold War civil wars became a 
dominant part of the peace and development landscape on the African continent and have 
since had devastating results for many of Africa‟s states and citizens. Prominent is the crisis 
in the Great Lakes region which has been referred to as Africa‟s World War with an estimate 
of over five million deceased and millions displaced and the heart of its conflict located in the 
eastern DRC (Prunier, 2009).  
 
In recent years there has been an increase in the critique of international peace operations. 
Some of this critique is rooted in critical theory and argues that a universal replicated 
approach to peace and development which builds on a liberal peace agenda promoting 
democratisation and marketisation in a top-down approach could in itself be an impediment 
for peace (Pugh, 2004: 39:41; Richmond and Franks, 2009). Pugh (2004:39, 41) argues that 
                                                          
1
 Peacekeeping is here defined as “the deployment of a lightly armed, multinational contingent of military 
personnel for nonenforcement purposes, such as the observation of a cease-fire” (Paris, 2004: 38). Newman, 
Paris and Richmond (2009: 6) argue how peace operations during the Cold War were aimed at containing and 
not resolving sources of conflict, as opposed to later complex peacebuilding operations. 
2
 Peacebuilding is here defined as “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and 
prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and civilian 
personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just 
emerging from a civil war” (Paris, 2004: 38). According to Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 7) 
peacebuilding includes a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs and areas such as security, 
development, humanitarian assistance and strengthening of governance of rule of law. Post-conflict 
reconstruction is part of the peacebuilding definition. 
3
 Peace operations are here defined as “any international peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, 
peacebuilding, or preventive diplomacy operations that include a multinational military force aimed at restoring 




such international efforts serve a narrow, problem-solving purpose
4
 built on the existing 
power relations in international politics and its liberal values, structures and ideology of good 
governance. The critique further states that the “liberal peace agenda” and the current project 
of liberal peacebuilding
5
 has inherent assumptions about peace and its applicability, 
particularly in non-Western societies (see for instance Taylor, 2007; Pugh 2004; Richmond 
2008; Richmond and Franks 2009; Newman 2009). Richmond (2008:13) explains how the 
discourse on peace takes place within a context of “conflicting images of peace”. How we 
think about and conceptualise peace is decisive for theorising and making policy about peace. 
Challenging the current assumptions and intellectual limitations about what peace is, and how 
it should be made, by rethinking the conceptualisation of peace and questioning the basic 
assumptions of the liberal peace agenda are prerequisites for understanding contemporary 
peacebuilding (Richmond, 2008: 94).  
 
Regional organisations and regional leading states have played an increasingly important role 
in peace efforts in unstable parts of the world (Sidiropoulos, 2007:11). Within the new 
international security paradigm, where regions such as South America and Africa are of 
relatively less international importance after the end of the bipolar world order and under the 
US so-called “war on terror”, a space for regional actors to define themselves as regional 
peace brokers and utilise regional responses to promote peace and security has opened up 
(Alden and Vieira, 2005; Gratius 2007; 2008). The role of these regional actors in peace 
processes, such as South Africa, Nigeria, India and Brazil, is increasingly receiving more 
attention within international relations (IR), as pivotal participants for creating peace and 
development in their neighbourhoods, and as emerging donors. Gratius (2008: 11) argues how 
“Brazil and South Africa are clearly stabilising powers which build integration agendas in 
their respective regions and take part in regional and international peace missions (...) both 
within and beyond their more immediate surroundings”.  
 
Motivated by the increasing critique against the international community‟s engagement in 
peace operations, this study aims at exploring the role of regional actors in peace and 
                                                          
4
 Problem-solving theory is theory which accepts the current world order as given, accepting the assumptions of 
existing policy (Cox, 1981). This will be discussed below. 
5
 Complex peace operations and initiatives have led to a nexus of statebuilding and peacebuilding, the liberal 
peacebuilding. Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 10) argue that complex and a broad range of peacebuilding 
activities and a core focus on building institutions based on market economies and democracy leads to the 





development in order to acquire information about the engagement of such actors. This 
increased centrality makes this a timely area to explore. This study will focus on one such 
regional actor which has marked itself by its increasing central role for promoting peace and 
development in Africa, namely South Africa
6
. Post-apartheid South Africa has marked itself 
as a strong regional actor particularly in mediation and peacemaking
7
. The development of 
Africa as well as the need of finding African solutions to African problems is expressed as 
amongst South Africa‟s main foreign policy priorities. As a promoter of an “African 
Renaissance”
8
 spearheaded by President Mbeki, South Africa has put considerable efforts and 
resources into building Africa‟s institutional capacity, including the African Union and 
regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Lifting the continent out of its marginal global position has been a vital part of South Africa‟s 
African agenda. South Africa has demonstrated its prominence on the continent and its 
commitment through various engagements in peace processes, which is argued to be premised 
on its own experience of a relatively peaceful transition to democracy through negotiation (De 
Coning, 2006).  
 
South Africa has played a particularly significant role in the complex peace process in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), leading the parties to a comprehensive peace 
agreement in 2003 and towards the first democratic election since independence, which took 
place in 2006. In addition to its central mediation role South Africa has also had a particularly 
prominent role in the peacebuilding process in the DRC (De Coning, 2006; Ajulu 2008). It is 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in the DRC which this study will explore further. 
 
This study aims at going beyond a descriptive analysis of South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in 
the DRC. Through a critical theory lens this study will challenge and go behind the 
contemporary assumptions about peacebuilding and the actors involved. By addressing South 
Africa, as an African actor, and analysing what structures lies behind its peacebuilding 
engagement in the DRC this study will add to the theoretical and policy related debate of 
current peacebuilding. An inclusive framework including all actors in peacebuilding 
processes open up for new questions in the discourse on peace. This study aims at 
                                                          
6
 “South Africa” is conceptualised as the South African government in this study. See 1.4. 
7
 Peacemaking is defined in this study in accordance with Paris’ conceptualisation; “Peacemaking is the attempt 
to resolve an ongoing conflict, either by peaceful means such as mediation and negotiation, or, if necessary, by 
the authorizion of an international military force to impose a settlement to the conflict [sic]”.  
8




investigating whether such actors, with a starting point grounded more locally, has a different 
approach to peacebuilding than multilateral engagements. Through a post-positivist approach 
the research question is not aimed at measuring how effective South Africa‟s peacebuilding 
initiatives are, but rather to question what kind of peace is promoted. 
 
This first chapter will serve as the motivation for conducting this particular study in terms of 
the theoretical approach and the related case study. Firstly, the research focus will be 
presented by looking at the aims and research question utilised for reaching these aims. 
Secondly, the motivation and significance of the study will be specified. Thirdly, the research 
design will be presented, elaborating on the technical elements of the project and its 
methodology. Fourthly, a chapter outline will be provided. 
1.1 Research Aims and Research Question  
 
Guided by the critique of liberal peacebuilding drawing mainly on the work of Duffield 
(2001), Pugh (2004), Richmond (2004; 2008), Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) and 
Richmond & Franks (2009) this study aims to: 
 
(i) Discover and critically examine South Africa‟s strategy and initiatives in the DRC 
peacebuilding process between 2003-2008  
(ii) Critically examine if South Africa‟s peacebuilding efforts, as a regional actor, are in 
line with the liberal peace agenda promoted by the international community 
 
The purpose of this study is to pursue reaching these two aims by answering the following 
research question (hypothesis): 
 
 Is South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC founded on the agenda of a 
liberal peace? 
 
By analysing the different initiatives undertaken by South Africa in the DRC within the 
timeframe 2003-2008 this study attempts to answer if South Africa‟s involvement in the DRC 
is promoting a liberal peacebuilding agenda. Through utilising critical theory this study aims 




Renaissance is in fact guided by liberal norms seen as universal. As such, South Africa to a 
lesser degree brings “African solutions” to the table in its effort to promote a long-term 
sustainable peace in the DRC.  
1.2 Motivation and significance 
1.2.1 Critical theory and peacebuilding 
 
Studies informed by an alternative mapping and non-technical issues (...) have 
been relatively few and far between, overshadowed by policy-driven concerns 
(Pugh, 2004: 40).  
 
The first area which this study aims at contributing to is the theoretical level. Theories of IR 
have been criticised for their narrow foundations with an empirical preoccupation reduced to 
the core of advanced industrialised states (Phillips, 2005; Duffield 2001). Thus, theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks have built on assumptions distinct for these often Western states
9
. 
The question of whether such frameworks are applicable for other types of states needs 
further attention. Consequentially, the ontology, which is the categories of what is and what 
kind of relations exist, of mainstream IR creates analytical concerns as the world moves 
towards a multipolar system after the end of the Cold War. This creates a need for an 
incorporation of political relations and actors on a global scale. The increasing engagement of 
regional actors increases the distinct need for a different focus when looking at peacebuilding.  
 
There are several perspectives of the concept of peace in IR theory
10
. Idealism, Realism, 
Liberalism, Constructivism and Marxism all have explanatory value in their conceptualisation 
of peace. This study, guided by a critical theory framework, does not aim to reject such 
“orthodox” theories. However, the methodology of these established theoretical frameworks 
do have inherent intellectual restrictions. Critical theory categorises these established theories 
as problem-solving and positivist in their methodology (Cox, 1981). Problem-solving and 
positivist theories are, from the view of critical theory, seen as theories which do not 
challenge the existing world system and the underlying environment in which power relations 
                                                          
9
 See for instance Dunn and Shaw (2001), Lemke (2003), Neuman (1998), Tickner (2003) and Phillips (2005). 
10
 A deeper discussion of the concept “peace” will not be elaborated on in this study, due to space and time 




exist, and knowledge, in other words the way we understand the world, is produced (Cox, 
1981). By accepting the assumptions and the foundation of existing policy such theories 
contribute to legitimating a system which is seen as unequal and where there is a lack of 
social justice and representation for marginalised actors (Richmond, 2008: 15). 
 
Critical theory is not a new strand of thinking in IR, but originates from the Frankfurt School 
of critical social thought which took form from the 1920‟s onwards (Richmond, 2008: 70). 
The idea of critical theory was presented as emancipatory in nature. By emancipatory it is 
meant at aiming at transformation of societies through reflection on power and knowledge 
aimed at social emancipation, as opposed to orthodox problem-solving positivist sciences. 
Critical theory has a post-positivist epistemology, which means a more meta-narrative method 
looking at how knowledge is produced and on what foundations this knowledge is built. 
Instead of concluding with universally applicable answers, a post-positivist approach to IR 
rather asks questions challenging the underlying foundation for the existing power relations in 
international politics.  
 
The core of critical theory is based on Robert Cox‟ (1981) famous saying that “theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose”. Knowledge is not objective and cannot be seen 
out of the context of the international structure, as opposed to positivist approaches. In other 
words, the argument is that all theories build on specific values and foundations, on which 
their epistemology of certain analyses is built and where knowledge is produced; they are 
subjective. Critical theory challenges the underlying structures of the environment in which 
actors act. Further, this approach has the potential to question and challenge these existing 
structures and the way we think about them and the institutions which dominate in the current 
international system.   
 
Thinking critically about peace proposes a significant potential by questioning the dominating 
discourse of liberal peace and its underlying assumptions. More orthodox theories fail to 
critically question the fundament on which states and other actors engage in peace processes 
and peacebuilding. By questioning the empirical, conceptual and normative presuppositions 
inherent in the dominating discourse on peacebuilding, the underlying structures of the 
environment in which contemporary peacebuilding takes place will be identified. Such an 




actors and structures involved as well as increasing the understanding of peacebuilding in 
practice. According to Newman (2009: 50): 
 
 The emergence of critical approaches to peacebuilding has provided a welcome 
opportunity to consider the significance of peacebuilding for international 
politics; or rather, to consider what peacebuilding tells us about the nature of 
international politics. This represents a real step beyond the problem-solving 
approaches that dominated the study of UN peace operations for decades. 
 
For this specific study, utilising critical theory advances the theoretical approach by 
questioning regional actors‟ role in peacebuilding and the structures of the environment in 
which they operate and the peace they promote. This rationale proposes a significant 
explanatory value when theorising particularly about actors from the developing world, which 
has been argued to be continuously marginalised within global politics and in the international 
system. The increase of regional actor‟s role in peacebuilding makes this study timely in 
contributing to a greater understanding of such peacebuilding efforts. 
 
The motivation for using critical theory derives from whether a point of departure, namely a 
critical approach to peacebuilding, challenging the ontology and epistemology of IR could 
reveal new aspects of actors in peace processes. Thus, this study could possibly advance our 
understanding of a wider range of actors in peacebuilding processes and the peace that is 
promoted. Whilst a critical approach to peacebuilding remains disputed by scholars of IR, the 
approach remains valuable when attempting to go beyond assumptions about actors‟ 
engagement in peace and development by identifying the foundations on which such 
engagements rest. However, a critical approach to peacebuilding has received criticisms for 
its meta-theorising nature as well as exaggerating the ability of peacebuilding actors to 
transform states and societies (Newman, 2009: 45). Another inherent weakness to a critical 
approach to peacebuilding that has been highlighted is viewing the contemporary 
peacebuilding project as a single hegemonic agenda of one specific interest (Newman, 2009: 
46). Richmond (2008: 132) argues that “the common understanding of peace that is offered 
through critical theory is not therefore unproblematic, given its reliance on a specific and 
claimed universal set of human norms and discourse ethics, but these have brought much 




as the United Nations (UN), World Bank, donors and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have a common objective formed as a global conspiracy. Rather, critical theory is 
utilised to revisit the discourse of peace and create a greater awareness of peacebuilding in 
theory as well as in practice. 
 
Other theoretical approaches within the critical theory tradition could, however be appropriate 
when analysing the increasing role of regional actors in peace processes and peacebuilding. 
Much has been written, and the literature is increasing, in the field of regional power theory 
(see for instance Flemes 2009, Nolte 2007, Schoeman 2003; 2007). The norms which shape 
the foreign policy of regional actors‟ engagement in their respective regions have received 
specific attention. When looking at the existing theory on regional powers, a regional power is 
in general perceived as an important country in its region and additionally with some sort of 
influence on the global level. Nolte (2007: 6) explains that “the topic of regional powers 
refers to power hierarchies in the international system. The assessment of the power 
distribution depends on the vantage point and the preselected indicators”. Strong regional 
actors with increasing regional and international influence have also been analysed through 
the lens of middle power theory
11
. Gratius (2008: 4) uses the term emerging powers for states 
such as South Africa, Brazil, India and China. She states how “an emerging power is, per se, a 
country which finds itself in a transformation process from one international position to a 
higher one: small power to medium power, medium to big, big to global”, related to the 
distribution of power in the international system. She argues how South Africa has the 
possibility to influence and stabilise its continent, much due to the lack of a dominating 
hegemon here. 
 
In an increasingly globalised world where the power balance is shifting, another useful angle 
to this study might have been the utilisation of such theories. However, these theories are 
mainly related to the political economy position of such actors, and not towards analysing 
peace and development specifically
12
. On the other hand, a critical theory approach to 
political economy could also shed light on regional powers‟ engagement in peace processes 
                                                          
11
 See for instance Jordan (2003). Solomon (1997), Van der Westhuizen (1998) and Schoeman (2000) have 
written on South Africa as an emerging middle power. Moreover, Taylor (2001) arguing that post-apartheid 
South Africa has (re)entered the global neo-liberal political economy, and Lee, Taylor and Williams (2006) 
which looks at South Africa’s role in multilateralism. 
12
 However there are some literature and it is increasing. See Duffield (2001), Pugh (2004; 2005), Pugh, Cooper 




and peacebuilding. If refined to the respective matter such theories could potentially yield 
knowledge, particularly in a comparative perspective. However, in order to utilise only one 
theoretical approach in this study, namely the liberal peacebuilding, this theory has not been 
applied here and thus poses a strong potential for further research. 
1.2.2 Linking theory and practice 
 
Extensive research has been conducted concerning the UN‟s role in peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding
13
. However, such studies have mainly focused on the policy level and been of a 
more technical nature, thereby lacking theoretical contextualisation. Moreover, such studies 
could be critiqued to be placed within the “peacebuilding consensus”, where the current 
approach to peacebuilding is seen as given and universal, which will be further discussed in 
chapter two (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 6). A critical approach to peacebuilding, with a 
post-positivist epistemology contributes to addressing the need in the study of IR to rethink 
and make globally applicable its theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundation in the area 
of peacebuilding.  
 
Thus, the second area of significance for this study is the contribution of moving towards a 
more refined understanding of regional actors‟ role in peacebuilding. In the absence of the 
above mentioned focus on the “South”, and actors in the South, there is a lack of empirical 
research on the topic. With reference to the specific case study here, the existing research on 
South Africa‟s role in peace processes has mainly focused on South Africa‟s foreign policy 
agenda, and mediation and peacemaking
14
. Several analysis of South Africa‟s foreign policy 
towards Africa has been made
15
. Previous studies have highlighted South Africa‟s capacity as 
well as limitations in peace efforts in Africa, and argued for diverging explanations for South 
Africa‟s broad engagement.  
 
South Africa has since 1994 increasingly positioned itself as an active promoter of peace and 
development in Africa. Throughout the last 15 years South Africa has gradually increased its 
engagement in several African conflicts, prominently as the leading mediator in the peace 
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process in Burundi, the DRC, Cote d‟Ivoire and Sudan. Moreover, analyses of South African 
foreign policy have mostly focused on cui bono through South African foreign policy due to 
its strong political and economic role on the continent. There is a lack of exploring the 
underlying foundations of the principles guiding South Africa‟s role in peace and 
development and its ambitious engagement particularly in the Great Lakes region. Even 
though South Africa‟s role in mediation has been written about in length, few of these studies 
have provided in-depth information on South Africa‟s strategy or role in peacebuilding. 
 
Moreover, existing studies have also rarely been contextualised within a critical theory 
framework to peace/peacebuilding. Whilst a descriptive analysis of South Africa‟s initiatives 
in the DRC peace process and peacebuilding would yield a degree of insight in the matter, an 
analysis built on a critical approach to peacebuilding could possibly advance the explanatory 
power and knowledge of regional actors‟ efforts in peacebuilding. Yet as South Africa has 
marked itself as vital in peace and development through concerted engagement in African 
conflicts and the efforts to promote itself as an African peacemaker and peacebuilder, its 
peacebuilding efforts has not yet been analysed in-depth through a critical theory framework. 
This is the main motivation for this study. 
 
In the existing literature South Africa‟s ability and capability of creating peace in African 
countries is questioned, however noting that this short overview is far from exhaustive. The 
arguments are often split into the debate between promoting ideational and global norms, as a 
“partner”, or being driven by own material interest, as a “hegemon”
16
. Scholars such as 
Schoeman (2003: 360) and Kagwanja (2009: 29) presents accusations against South Africa as 
being too Western and not “African enough”, despite Mbeki‟s rhetoric of “Africanism”, 
which breeds suspicion and distrust about South Africa‟s bona fides. Kabemba (2006) and 
Flemes (2009) argue how capacity and effort of promoting international norms such as human 
rights and development of democracy, promoting a highly Westernised agenda, is  limited due 
to suspicion of its motivations, again manifested in South Africa‟s past. Kagwanja (2009) also 
highlights South Africa‟s multilateral limitations. Neethling (2003) argues how altruism is 
one of the main reasons for South Africa‟s involvement in peacekeeping. 
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Schoeman (2003: 361), amongst others, argues that South Africa‟s capacity to influence is 
overstated by its neighbours, and particularly by the West, who expect South Africa to act like 
a regional leader with hegemonic powers and capabilities. Alden and Soko (2005: 388) 
illustrate how South Africa‟s role as a mediator in Zimbabwe has shown the shortcomings of 
its attempts at providing stability, and the inability to influence its neighbours, expressing 
South Africa‟s “limits of hegemony”. Further, the emergence of critical literature from a 
political economy perspective should also be mentioned, which elaborates on South Africa‟s 
imperialist or sub-imperialist power and intentions (see for instance Lee, Taylor and 
Williams, 2006; Taylor 2001; Williams 2000). Flemes (2009) builds on Pedersen‟s (2002) 
theory of co-operative hegemony to argue that South Africa‟s influence as a regional power is 
restrained by its historical legacy. Despite its capacity as a military and economic stronghold 
compared to its African neighbours the limitations of South Africa‟s regional role are evident 
(see Kabemba, 2006; Ajulu 2008; Flemes 2009). Ajulu (2008) underlines how assumptions 
are made on South Africa‟s potential for creating peace in its region.  
 
Several scholars analyse South Africa‟s national interest as material interest only – its 
economic interest. More critical scholars, such as McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998), 
have previously argued that South Africa is concerned first and foremost with its own national 
security, not regional security. Nel, Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, (2001) and Taylor 
(2001) argues that South Africa‟s bona fides in Africa is based on its strong economic 
position in the region, and its closeness with neo-liberalism and its capitalist macroeconomic 
policies, as well as suggesting that South Africa benefits from maintaining the status quo.  
 
Despite South Africa‟s commitment to economic, military and “diplomatic” engagements in 
the region, several authors argue that African states and actors proves uncommitted to South 
Africa‟s foreign policy actions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD) (Landberg and Hlophe, 1999; Taylor and Williams; 2001; Alden and Vieira, 2005; 
Kawanja, 2006). Lee, Taylor and Williams (2006) analyse South Africa‟s increasing 
diplomacy and role as a bridge builder between the North and the South in multilateral 
channels and state that South Africa‟s global position is of a neo-liberal approach, despite as 
Lee, Tyler and Van der Westhuizen (2001) argue, acting as reformist in multilateral forums. 




on the African continent are built on a neo-liberal foundation, thus questioning if these efforts 
are likely to promote long term sustainable peace. Williams, P. (2000) has written an 
interesting study guided by Critical Security Studies literature arguing how South Africa must 
search for a different development approach than the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Plan (GEAR) in order to deal with poverty, inequality and unemployment. 
Williams further highlights the contradiction of the neo-liberal economic policy and the 
incapability of dealing with such issues at home. 
 
However, South Africa‟s approach in the White Paper on Participation in International 
Peace Missions (DFA, 1999) emphasises the normative foundations which represent its 
national interest. Kagwanja (2009) for instance, argues that the driving factors for South 
Africa‟s involvement in conflict resolution and stabilisation are diverse, from aspirational, in 
other words the promotion of human rights and democracy, to more pragmatic concerns 
related to the instability and conflicts having effects for South Africa. According to 
Sidiropoulos (2007:1): 
 
 Many argue that South Africa„s promotion of human rights and democracy in its 
external engagement is motivated by its principles. The country can be regarded 
as increasingly driven by realpolitik however. (...) Much of South Africa‟s foreign 
policy is still driven by its values, though. (...) South Africa believes that 
attempting to counter the global system‟s skewed nature must be a crucial element 
of its foreign policy. The country‟s very active multilateralism can partially be 
explained by these factors. 
 
Within IR theory, diverging analysis are proposed on South Africa‟s role in peace and 
development in the region. From a realist perspective the peace initiatives in the resource rich 
DRC and particularly its involvement in peacebuilding will be explained as driven by South 
Africa‟s own interest and benefit (Gueli, 2008).  Explanations following a liberalist 
perspective argue for an idealist approach based on norms and values facilitated through 
multilateral cooperation and as such, South Africa‟s engagements are based on the benefit for 
international peace and security. Critical analysts, such as McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 




other capitalist forces to access and exploit the resources in the DRC, based on neo-liberal 
principles.  
 
It is evident that academic contributions on South Africa‟s foreign policy propose a 
contradictory and ambiguous picture on the role South Africa plays in relation to its region, 
the continent and in the global context, despite a somewhat consistency in its foreign policy 
when it comes to peace and development
17
. However, a complementary view of diverging 
factors also seems to be the general argument in previous research. These are interesting 
views to bring into this study. Moreover, this ties into the critique of South Africa as more 
Western than African, which also feeds into the motivation for this study for a deeper analysis 
of the foundations on which South Africa builds its peacebuilding engagements, conducted by 
looking specifically at its role in the DRC. 
 
By focusing on peacebuilding through critical theory this study offers a refined understanding 
of one regional actor engaging as an agent in the nexus of peace and development in its 
neighbourhood. Daley‟s (2007) study on the peace process in Burundi should be mentioned 
here. Daley argues that peace agreements are not a compromise for peace, but rather a 
stalemate between international, regional and local actors. Further, he claims that the Burundi 
peace process is a struggle between different visions of peace. Regional actors attempted to 
implement an alternative policy suited for the African context, as opposed to the international 
community and Western donors, however they had to accept the “imposition of the liberal 
peace” (Daley, 2007: 334). 
 
The aim here is not to see South Africa as a solution, or obstacle, to the conflict, or to criticise 
the South African government‟s extensive engagement in the search of peace in the DRC. By 
analysing South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement through a critical theory framework this 
study challenges assumptions about engagements in peace processes. Such assumptions have 
received little attention. This study thus supplements the existing research thereby refining the 
understanding of such engagements. Critical theory contributes to unveiling the structures that 
South Africa promotes in its peacebuilding initiatives, and moreover clarifying the 
environment in which these initiatives takes place.  
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1.2.3 The complex conflict in the DRC 
 
The third level where this study will add significant analysis is of empirical and geographic 
relevance to the DRC and South Africa‟s engagement there. The multiple crises in the Great 
Lakes region, including the DRC, have engaged extensive attention from regional and 
international actors in mediation, negotiation and peace operations in the last decade. 
Extensive research has been done both on the conflict in the DRC and the instability in the 
Great Lakes region, the peace process and the peacebuilding phase
18
. The DRC is moreover a 
significantly important country for stability and development of the African continent, due to 
its vast area and borders to nine African countries, and its massive resources posing a great 
potential for Africa (Kabemba, 2006: 152). Despite the peace process “the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue”, led by South Africa, the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003, the 
holding of democratic elections in 2006 and the formation of a power-sharing government 
there has been little success in stabilising the country, particularly in the eastern parts. The 
largest UN mission in the world, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with close to 20.000 peacekeepers has had great challenges 
in fulfilling its mandate of mainly protecting civilians and creating stability in the war torn 
eastern Congo. However, despite its weakness, the UN mission has still played a significant 
role in the DRC, particularly with regards to the 2006 election.  
 
Although there has been a significant increase of studies and policy briefs on the situation in 
the DRC, few academic literary works has focused on peacebuilding in the DRC
19
. Most of 
the existing studies are also policy related and have been conducted outside a theoretical 
framework, except for recent studies such as Eriksen (2009) and Autesserre (2007; 2008; 
2010). Eriksen utilises a critical theory framework discussing the liberal peace, and Autessere 
a “top-down peacebuilding” approach critiquing the international peacebuilding approach in 
the transitional phase from 2003-2006 for not including peacebuilding on the local level. 
Additionally, Swart (2010; 2011) has made recent contributions looking at the DRC post-
peace accord identifying the gains and challenges for peace in the DRC and how the status 
quo of “no war, no peace” is perpetuated in the eastern DRC. Koko (2011) argues that there 
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will be no peace in the DRC as long as local conflict dynamics is not addressed properly and 
root causes are included in the peacebuilding process, including on a regional level. However, 
these studies‟ main focus is to identify what has failed as a consequence of international 
peacebuilding. This study aims at contributing to existing studies by identifying whether 
South Africa, as a regional African actor, has a similar approach to peacebuilding as 
represented by current attempts by the international community.  
 
South Africa has played a particularly dominant, committed and critical role in the complex 
mediation efforts and peace agreements in the Great Lakes region, namely in Burundi and the 
DRC (Kagwanja, 2006; Sidiropoulos, 2007; Ajulu, 2008: 272). South Africa has been an 
important actor in the mediation efforts and transitional process, through negotiating peace 
agreements that led to transitional governments (De Coning, 2006; Ajulu, 2008), as well 
playing a central role in post-conflict and reconstruction initiatives.  In the DRC, South 
Africa‟s role has seemingly changed from mediator into being more explicit a peacebuilding 
“partner” after the finalisation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2003 (Ajulu, 2008: 256).  
 
Some focused research has, however, been conducted on South Africa‟s role in the DRC 
peace process, although with the predominant focus and analysis on mediation and 
peacemaking and not on South Africa‟s peacebuilding role
20
 (Gueli, 2008). It is also argued 
here that little attention has been given to a critical view on peacebuilding in general, which 
leaves a major gap in the study of African conflicts, peace processes and peacebuilding. This 
study will thus add to the existing literature by filling a gap through providing a critical 
analysis of South Africa‟s initiatives in the post-conflict process in the DRC from 2003-2008. 
This need in IR will be addressed by rethinking and making globally applicable its theoretical, 
conceptual and empirical foundation, with a core focus on the African context.  
1.3 Methodology and research design 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in the DRC through 
a critical theory approach. This study will be descriptive as it discovers South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding initiatives. Additionally, it will be of an exploratory nature, as it will explore 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in depth through a critical theory lens. Importantly, this 
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study will apply existing critical peacebuilding theory, draw conclusions and further show 
wider applicability and how it can influence existing theory with regards to actors in 
peacebuilding. The study is thus deductive as it aims at discussing and testing existing theory 
and concepts, in a sort of top down approach. This is opposed to inductive studies, where the 
data often leads to developing concepts (Yin, 2011: 93). Yin (2011: 94) highlights how 
deductive studies usually are qualitative. This study, based on the nature of the research 
question, will be of a qualitative nature. The study will analyse official government 
documents from existing primary and secondary sources, in addition to building on relevant 
secondary sources on the topic, such as academic articles and literature, and other relevant 
textual sources.  
 
Due to the nature of the research question and the descriptive and exploratory research, a 
single case study design was chosen for this specific study. A case study adds to a theoretical 
and empirical field through analysing each empirical case separately usually in a qualitative 
manner. Consequently, such a design has the function to supplement more generalised or 
quantitative studies and importantly contribute with case specific theoretical and empirical 
explanatory value. It is important to note that findings of a case study are generally applicable 
to a certain context, due to the specificity of the theoretical approach merged with the case 
study. Therefore, one must be aware of drawing conclusions on single case studies to a certain 
extent is a generalisation (Yin, 2011: 98). Regardless, this study will contribute with data for a 
deeper understanding of South Africa‟s engagement in peace processes and peacebuilding, 
with specific reference to its role in the DRC. Moreover, it potentially could have 
applicability to other regional actors and peacebuilding processes. It also advances the 
contemporary discourses on peacebuilding, and the role of different actors in such processes. 
This case study will be informed by theory, due to its deductive nature. Through a post-
positivist approach the research question is not aimed at measuring how effective South 
Africa‟s peacebuilding initiatives are, but rather to question how we think about peace. This is 
decisive for theorising about and making policy for peacebuilding. Awareness about the 
methodology utilised when thinking about peace is fundamental for the understanding of 
peace, as a theoretical and empirical concept. 
 
The data gathering is mainly of three different categories. First is the theoretical data 




role in Africa, and third, data on South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC. This 
study, for the empirical parts, mainly uses South African government sources to explore 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC, and the structures which South Africa 
expresses as the foundation for its engagement. Several sources of information strengthens a 
case study approach, thus one must be aware that for this study, the expressed views and 
actions of South Africa‟s role in peacebuilding is used as the foundation for the research. This 
is mainly due to the lack of other sources on the topic, which a larger research project could 
have utilised. However, using a single case study and a critical theory approach, the validity 
of this study is not meant to present an unquestionable hypothesis. Rather, it will be a 
contribution to increase the knowledge about peacebuilding in order to stimulate the 
theoretical and practical debate built on the accessible empirical evidence. 
1.4 Delimitations/limitations 
 
Due to time constraints, financial and practical constraints, the analysis of this study will limit 
itself in several aspects. Firstly, this study is restrained (delimited) to looking at the South 
African government‟s engagement in the DRC peacebuilding. The level of analysis in this 
study is limited to focus on the relations between South Africa and the DRC on a state level. 
The choice of the state as an ontology for this study is made based on the prominent 
relationship between South Africa and the DRC on a state level. However, critical theory is 
used going beyond the orthodox state level focus in IR, as well as challenging the 
understanding of peace, and the actors involved. This is to some extent challenged here, as 
South Africa is not seen as one of the core states in the international system. Moreover, it is 
recognised that due to such delimitation, dynamics that would be highlighted by a different 
level of analysis, such as global, regional and local, certain weaknesses can arise. Also, South 
Africa is only one of the actors in the peace process in DRC. The involvement of the UN and 
other actors, except for where South Africa‟s engagement through MONUC is relevant, will 
not be taken into account in this study.  
 
Secondly, the access to public information has shown a limitation. Primary sources are 
limited to those publicly accessible, also meaning that some information will not be 
accessible. Secondary sources will be utilised in order to balance this constraint. However, 




the South African government has also been restrictive on the information sharing related to 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding efforts in general and towards the DRC. Using government as 
well as other sources might also pose a risk for using biased sources. 
 
A third limitation, and delimitation, of this study is its scope. A broader or comparative 
analysis of South Africa‟s engagement in peace processes on the continent would provide a 
more comprehensive study, from which more general conclusions could be drawn. Further, a 
study of all South African engagement, including private sector engagement, could shed light 
on the dynamics and contradictions of its presence. However, as proposed above, this study is 
limited to suggesting a framework for understanding the peacebuilding initiatives of South 
Africa‟s government. Additionally, the contribution could be applicable to other regional 
actors in peacebuilding and leave possibilities for comparative analyses.  
 
A fourth delimitation of this study is the time frame. It is delimited to 2003 till 2008; from the 
finalisation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue agreement to the end of Mbeki‟s presidency. 
Between 1996 and 2003 South Africa was engaged as one of the main mediators in the 
conflict in the DRC. However, the time frame after the signing of the peace agreement in 
2003 will be the core focus of this study. This is also delimited as a result of the prominent 
role President Mbeki has had in relations to the DRC peacebuilding process and in promoting 
African peace and development. President Mbeki was central in the DRC peace process from 
the time when he became president in June 1999, until he stepped down in September 2008. 
Further, it is behind the ambit of length and focus of this study to give a comprehensive 
overview of the 1997-2003 period. However, as part of the historical background, and to get a 
comprehensive backdrop for South Africa‟s peacebuilding role, the peacemaking will be 
briefly assessed as a part of chapter three.  
 
A fifth delimitation relates to the theoretical nature of the study. This study aims at analysing 
South Africa‟s engagement in peacebuilding. As indicated above several other theoretical 
frameworks could be utilised here. However, as indicated above and as will be elaborated on 
in chapter two, the selection of a critical approach to peacebuilding could unveil a deeper 
understanding of South Africa‟s peacebuilding role that more orthodox theories of IR would 





1.5 Chapter outline 
 
This first chapter has identified the context and motivation for the research to be conducted. 
The research question has been presented and will guide the further work of the study and to 
be answered in the final chapter. Further, the purpose and the significance have been clarified 
and the methodology has laid the frame for the study.  
 
Chapter 2 Theorising peacebuilding 
Chapter two will present the theoretical debates on peacebuilding. Current understandings of 
peace will be explained as a foundation for the further exploration of critical theory and the 
concept of peace and peacebuilding. This chapter will, through critical theory, present and 
discuss the assumptions about current liberal peacebuilding and present some of its inherent 
contradictions. This proposed framework will serve as the theoretical foundation for the 
further chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 South Africa promoting peace in Africa 
In accordance with the proposed theoretical framework in chapter two, chapter three will trace 
various dimensions of South Africa‟s role in peace processes in general, with a specific 
relevance to Africa. This is done firstly by establishing how South Africa has positioned itself 
through statements and policy documents in order to show what role South Africa has 
pictured itself to have in peace and development in the region. Further, the study will identify 
the foundations for South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagements.  
 
Chapter 4 South Africa’s peacebuilding project in the DRC  
Chapter four will provide an in depth analysis of South Africa‟s initiatives in the DRC within 
the given time frame of the study, 2003-2008 guided by the theoretical framework to be 
suggested in chapter two. This chapter will argue how South Africa has changed from a 
peacemaker in the DRC to a peacebuilder engaging in a broad range of areas. Further, the 
chapter will investigate, based on chapter two and three, the foundations on which South 







Chapter 5 Building a liberal peace? 
Finally, chapter five will bring together the analysis conducted and conclusions reached in the 
preceding chapters. Using a critical theory approach to peacebuilding, chapter three and four 
has led this study to the conclusion that South Africa is building a liberal peace in the DRC. 
This chapter will also highlight the most important contradictions in South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding role. Further, this chapter will summarize the explanatory value of critical 
theory and how this approach advances the discourse and practice of peacebuilding. The 




2 Theorising peacebuilding 
2.1 Introduction 
This study is guided by an attempt at advancing the understanding of regional actors in 
peacebuilding, focusing on South Africa. Informed by the dominating debates on South 
Africa‟s regional role, revisited in chapter one, this chapter will stimulate the theoretical 
thinking about peacebuilding. This will be conducted by using a critical approach mainly 
building on the works of Richmond (2008) and Richmond & Franks (2009), as well as 
Duffield (2001), Pugh (2004) and Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009).  
 
This chapter will challenge the ontological and epistemological barriers of the current 
discourse of peacebuilding guided by a framework based on critical theory. Thinking 
critically about peace presents a potentially valuable avenue for attempting to question the 
dominating discourse of liberal peace and its underlying assumptions. Only by questioning 
the empirical, conceptual assumptions inherent in the dominating discourse on peacebuilding, 
the underlying structures of the environment in which contemporary peacebuilding takes 
place can be identified. Hence, this approach has the potential of contributing to a more 
nuanced theorising on peacebuilding and increasing the understanding of peacebuilding in 
practice, in a broader and critical perspective. 
 
Firstly, this study will be contextualised within existing IR theory on peace and 
peacebuilding. Secondly, the origins of peacebuilding will be briefly presented as a backdrop 
for the further theoretical framework. Thirdly, the motivations for using critical theory in the 
discourse on peace will be presented. Fourthly, a presentation and discussion about the liberal 
peace and the critical approach to the liberal peacebuilding will be given.  
2.2 Globalising actors in peacebuilding 
 
As touched upon in the previous chapter IR has been criticised for its narrow foundations with 
an empirical preoccupation reduced to the core of advanced industrialised states. Theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks are as a consequence of such narrow foundations built on 
assumptions distinct for such states. Phillips (2005: 2) argues that “the „Third World‟ has 




to a certain extent issues and discourses of peace. Arguably, the ontology of mainstream IR 
has to a certain extent been reduced to the major world powers (Phillips, 2005). This 
“mainstream intellectual hegemony” creates analytical concerns as the world moves towards a 
multipolar system after the end of the Cold War. Despite an increase in IR on emerging actors 
outside the west there is still a great need to incorporate such actors. Herein lays a challenge 
for orthodox theories of IR. Thus, there is a great need for incorporating political relations and 
actors on a global scale, which this study aims to address.    
 
The emergence of regional actors as prominent in peace and development is an important 
motivation for this study. Peacebuilding could arguably often be related to UN peace 
operations, with military and political efforts. However, such international initiatives are only 
part of a much wider spectrum of activities and actors in peacebuilding. This study aims to 
contribute to address this need in the study of IR by rethinking and making globally 
applicable its theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundation, here with a theoretical and 
empirical focus on the African context. An inclusive analytical framework which examines 
regional actors‟ engagement in peacebuilding will contribute to advancing the explanatory 
value of the topic. This approach will go beyond an “orthodox” focus in peacebuilding and 
the critique aimed at such international efforts. By focusing on regional actors in 
peacebuilding, in this case South Africa, this study challenges the ontology not only on major 
world powers, but also multilateral actors such as the UN. Further, the approach proposes a 
post-positivist methodology, as touched upon in chapter one. Therefore, this study has the 
potential to contribute to a better and more nuanced understanding of what kind of peace 
actors in the field, including those engaging in their own regions, promotes. Advancing this 
understanding will further lead to academic and policy clarifications and contributions.  
 
2.3 The origins of peacebuilding 
 
Peacebuilding consists of a massive and diverse field of study, policy and practice which 
shapes the thinking and practice of peacebuilding in different ways (Richmond, 2008: 3). 
Diverging definitions of peacebuilding exists between scholars, policy makers and those 
working in the field. As a result, the diverse interpretations and practices of peacebuilding 




approaches to peacebuilding propose diverging understandings of its theoretical and the 
practical concept.  
 
Before going into the critical theory view of peacebuilding a short review of the history of the 
term peacebuilding will be revisited. Johan Galtung, seen as one of the main intellectuals in 
peace studies, first introduced the term peacebuilding in 1975 in his article “Three approaches 
to Peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding”. Galtung (1975: 297) proposed 
peacebuilding as the structure of peace based on a mechanism offering an alternative to war 
where “structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in 
situations where wars might occur”. According to Galtung‟s understanding, peacebuilding in 
its basic form aims at creating a sustainable peace based on structural solutions addressing 
root causes of the specific conflict, by building on local capacities. Lederach (1997: 184) has 
argued for a broader understanding of peacebuilding towards a conflict transformation 
through a holistic and multi-faceted approach to broad social participation, “building 
relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes and structures”.  
 
Peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, 
generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed 
to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term 
thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace 
accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a 
condition. It is a dynamic social construct (Lederach, 1997: 84). 
 
Peacebuilding is defined by Paris (2004: 38) as “action undertaken at the end of a civil 
conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission 
involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international 
agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from a 
civil war”. More concretely, Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 7) state how peacebuilding 
includes a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs and areas such as security, 
development, humanitarian assistance and strengthening of governance of rule of law.  
 
Paris (2004: 2) argues how challenges in the security arena after the end of the Cold War led 




peacebuilding in practice emerged as a broader approach to peace and development. These 
missions were to take the shape of peacebuilding operations where the UN, other leading 
governmental and non-governmental organisations would play a leading role. The shift 
towards more intra-state conflicts made humanitarian assistance and the protection of 
civilians as one of the core tasks for these missions, together with establishing conditions for 
stable and long-lasting peace.  
 
Despite the strong efforts, the limited success of traditional peacekeeping, mainly by the UN, 
created a need for a broader approach to making or keeping peace. Previous peacekeeping 
missions showed an insufficient impact in attempting to create peace in the changing nature of 
conflict as 50% of civil wars reoccurred within 5 years (Smith, 2004). This created an 
increased focus on addressing root causes of conflict as well as linking peace and 
development in order to achieve lasting and sustainable peace. The nexus of peace and 
development created a complex and rather specific peacebuilding focus including addressing 
root causes of conflict, including structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and 
environmental factors.  
 
As a reaction to these needs the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali (1992) established the 
term post-conflict peace-building on the international agenda in 1992 in his report to the 
Security Council, An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping. Here, the definition of peacebuilding is a project for (re)building nations after 
conflict and “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.  Importantly, this UN definition 
underscores that “post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative 
projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not 
only contribute to economic and social development although also enhance the confidence 
that is so fundamental to peace”. An Agenda for Peace further calls attention to the broad and 
complex approach of peacebuilding by observing peacebuilding, “in surveying the range of 
efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment 
should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the 





Subsequently to “An Agenda for Peace”, several other UN documents addressed 
peacebuilding, further expanding this notion. In 2000 the definition of peacebuilding was 
refined to "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just 
the absence of war" in the Brahimi Report (UN 2000: 3). It is noteworthy that project of 
peacebuilding here was underlined as a hybrid of politics and development (UN, 2000: 8). 
Further engaging with local parties and having a multidimensional engagement was 
highlighted. In 2006 the Peacebuilding Commission was established to support UN efforts of 
peacebuilding followed by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(UN, s.a.). The Peacebuilding Commission‟s role is to coordinate, marshal funds and to carry 
out “advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and 
recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace” 
(UN, s.a.). 
 
In the African context, the AU is responsible for peace and development on the continent. The 
New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), which is the socio-economic 
development programme of the AU, approved a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework in 
2005
21
. This framework was followed by the AU adoption of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development Policy in 2006. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework is an African 
agenda, and a common platform for all actors for “post-conflict reconstruction” merging “the 
nexus of peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding” (NEPAD, 2005; iv). The framework defines peacebuilding 
as an “action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” and further “managing the transition from 
violent conflict to sustainable peace and development” (NEPAD, 2005: iii). The NEPAD 
policy will be discussed further in the following chapter when addressing South Africa‟s 




The conceptualisation of peacebuilding is representative for the ways of measuring and 
evaluating effectiveness (Newman, 2009: 27). More narrow and technicist definitions might 
more easily evaluate international peacebuilding projects as successful. On the other hand, 
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broader definitions could lead to more modest conclusions of the achievements of such 
projects. Reflected in the definitions above, the creation of new structures and environments 
for peace are seen as the core of peacebuilding, either in a post-conflict situation or during 
conflict. These structures are to be based on addressing root causes as well as local capacities 
in the country concerned. Peacebuilding is thus a much broader and ambitious activity than 
traditionally limited peacekeeping or peacemaking efforts, as long-term stability is the goal, 
either after or in some instances during conflict (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008: 2).  
 
Peace operations represent a nexus where efforts for peace, security, development and state 
building meet – with the aim of creating a sustainable peace.  There is a noticeable 
convergence of the notion of development and security, or peace. It is not just a policy 
concern; it has political and structural implications. This integration opens up for a lot of 
questions related to the agenda of peace, and what kind of peace is the aim of such 
comprehensive projects. These questions, seen as assumptions and contradictions in current 
peacebuilding projects, and how peacebuilding is politicised, will be discussed in depth below 
guided by critical theory.  
 
2.4 Thinking critically about peace 
 
Before venturing into an analysis of the term peacebuilding it is necessary to present the 
methodology and an explanatory potential of critical theory. This particular theory is utilized 
in this study, based on its potential to contribute to the current theoretical debates of 
peacebuilding towards a broader understanding of peace and peacebuilding. How we think 
about peace is decisive for theorizing about and making policy for peace processes and 
peacebuilding. Awareness about the methodology utilised when thinking about peace is 
fundamental for the understanding of peace, and peacebuilding, as a theoretical and empirical 
concept.  
 
Richmond (2008: 122) argues how critical theory has opened up for a greater influence and 
richer debates in IR. With its origins rooted in the Frankfurt School of critical social thought 
in the 1920s, the core of critical theory has been its aim to transform societies through 




seeing patterns of knowledge production, and how knowledge is produced. Critical theory 
asks questions which challenge international politics and its power relations, rather than 
claiming to find unquestionable answers which are universally applicable. Further, it unveils 
the norms on which the international system is built on.  
 
Richmond (2008: 13) presents the discourse on peace as taking place within a context of 
“conflicting images of peace”. As mentioned in chapter one the established frameworks of 
Idealism, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Marxism all have conceptualisations of 
peace which has inherent theoretical value. However, the restrictions of these theories, 
particularly due to their problem-solving and positivist nature, have theoretical and practical 
limitations
23
. Richmond (2008: 1) argues that the discourse on peace has been “concerned 





The methodology of these established theoretical frameworks, here meant as the dominating 
schools of realism, liberalism and constructivism, fail to critically question the underlying 
structures of the environment in which states and other actors engage in peace processes. A 
critical approach to peace and peacebuilding has a unique potential of contributing to this gap 
in theorising about peacebuilding, providing a more nuanced understanding of the 
peacebuilding project. Richmond (2008: 17) bases his methodology on critical theory and in 
accordance with Cox‟ (1981) argument of knowledge as subjective. Thus, peace is a 
subjective concept which understanding depends on different actors‟ definition, method, 
ontological and epistemological approach, as well as the level of analysis, thus being subject 
to many different interpretations. All theories build on specific values and foundations as a 
result of their ontology and epistemological nature. The historical context in which 
peacebuilding takes place is vital for analyses of critical theory (Richmond, 2008: 124). This 
is an important backdrop for understanding the liberal peace, which is shaped in a liberal 
environment. Newman (2009: 50) and Richmond (2008: 12) argue how critical approaches to 
peacebuilding thus provide knowledge about international politics and further uncover 
relations of power and knowledge within the current international system.  
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Thinking critically about the subjective concept of peace, how it is theorised upon and what 
peace should be and bring about is an important element in the method of critical theory. 
Questioning given assumptions about peace could possibly unveil contradictions of the 
current peacebuilding project, and in this study including regional actor‟s involvement in 
peace processes. Further, critical theory has the potential to identify the existing structures 
influencing the foreign policy behaviour of regional actors in peacebuilding. Further, it opens 
up for questioning and challenging these structures and the way we think about them, 
including the institutions which dominate the current international system and how they lay 
the frames for how we think about peace.  Moreover, seeing through a critical lens and 
understanding peace as an emancipatory peace
25
 includes marginalised actors and discourses 
(Richmond, 2008: 15). These are some of the main potentials of explanatory power of critical 
theory that other theoretical approaches cannot offer.  Richmond (2008: 131) explains: 
 
“Critical theories offer a vision of an emancipatory, everyday and empathetic form of peace in 
the context of a post-conventional, post-Westphalian IR. This is a post-sovereign peace, 
though it extends aspects of idealist, liberal, structuralist and pluralistic debates (a common 
peace system and emancipation), to produce a powerful critique of the liberal peace and its 
underlying liberal-realist problem solving framework which rests on territorial sovereignty. It 
is driven by an intellectual question about what form emancipation would take in material and 
discursive terms, and how it can be achieved”. 
 
Thus, critical theory has a strong potential for advancing the discourse and practice of peace 
and the complexity of peacebuilding, going beyond orthodox assumptions and questioning 
inherent contradictions within the current debates on the peacebuilding project. The aim of 
this study is not to utilise critical theory in order to criticise external actors who contribute 
with knowledge, capacity and resources to peace processes. Rather, the choice of critical 
theory is motivated by its potential to challenge the ontology and epistemology of approaches 
to IR and opening up for a broader and deeper discussion on peacebuilding.   
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For this specific study, utilising critical theory advances the theoretical approach by 
questioning regional actors‟ role in peacebuilding and the environment in which they operate 
and the peace they promote. This rationale proposes a significant explanatory power when 
theorising particularly about actors from the developing world, which has been argued to be 
continuously marginalised within global politics and in the international system. The increase 
of regional actors‟ role in peacebuilding makes this study timely in contributing to a greater 
understanding of such peacebuilding efforts. 
 
2.5 Liberal peacebuilding 
2.5.1 The liberal peace thesis 
 
 “The nature of the international order is heavily contested in theoretical, methodological, 
ontological and epistemological terms, meaning that the consensus on the contemporary 
liberal peace represents an anomalous agreement rather than a broad-ranging consensus.”  
(Richmond, 2008: 6). 
 
The dominant debate about the concept of peace in contemporary theory - and practice - is the 
liberal peace, an understanding of peace with its foundation grounded in liberal thinking 
(Richmond, 2008). Immanuel Kant is seen as the father of liberal peace, where political and 
economic liberalisation is a prerequisite for creating an environment and structures for peace.  
Paris (2004: 6) argues that the idea that democratic and liberal states would be more peaceful 
underlies this debate. The promotion of a liberal democracy and a market economy would 
thus be a remedy for conflict as it is less likely that such states will go to war against each 
other (Paris, 2004: 22). The idea of democratic forms of governments as being more peaceful 
goes back to the Enlightenment and early liberal thinkers such as John Locke and Adam 
Smith
26
 (Paris, 2004: 41). However, the idea of a liberal peace has been transferred to a post-
Cold War environment which is increasingly multipolar and where conflicts to a large extent 
are of an intrastate nature. Thus the idea of a liberal peace is viewed suitable also for 
preventing or curbing intrastate conflicts.  
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Duffield (2001: 11) explains: 
 
The idea of liberal peace (...) combines and conflates „liberal‟ (as in 
contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with „peace‟ (the present 
policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). It 
reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached 
through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising and, especially, 
transformative measures. While this can include the provision of immediate relief 
and rehabilitation assistance, liberal peace embodies a new or political 
humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and 
prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative 
institutions, promoting the rule of law, and society sector reform in the context of 
a functioning market economy. 
 
According to Richmond and Franks (2009: 4) the conceptual framework for the liberal peace 
“has emerged through a complex evolution within a very specific political, economic, social, 
conceptual and methodological environment, which has universal ambitions, nevertheless”. 
As such, peace is to be reached by building the foundation for state security and human 
security issues including democratisation, human rights, civil society, the rule of law and 
economic liberalisation, meaning free market reform and development (Richmond and 
Franks, 2009: 3). Building a liberal state implies that peace equals governance, and the 
institutions of this liberal state is essential for the construction of the liberal peace (Richmond 
and Franks, 2009: 6).  Richmond and Franks (2009: 6) describes this as follows: “The liberal 
state provides the framework for the creation of peace at local, state and international levels 
through governmentalism and its relation to institution building. This has become the most 
common form of peace, applied by international actors through a methodological 
peacebuilding consensus in conflict zones”.  
 
The complex peace operations emerging after the end of the Cold War, involving the UN, and 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank, took the shape of ambitious 
projects attempting at creating peace through the construction of the liberal state (Richmond 




peace is a consensus for peacebuilding, focusing on the building of environments and 
structures, or institutions, conducive for the emergence of a liberal state. The liberal peace, 
through a critical theory lens, is then seen as the current dominant, and given, discourse and 
epistemological approach to peace in IR theory
27
 (Richmond, 2008: 6; 13). 
 
2.5.2 The critique of the liberal peace 
 
As the idea of a liberal peace between liberal states is part of the framework for seeking 
peaceful solutions to contemporary conflicts, Duffield (2001: 11) argues that despite the end 
of the Cold War and a change from more interstate to intrastate conflicts, the shift from 
traditional peacekeeping to more complex peacebuilding clearly indicates how policy has 
changed – not necessarily the nature of conflicts
28
. In traditional peacekeeping the aim of 
peacekeeping mission was to contain a peace and prevent the escalation of violence. 
However, in contemporary complex peacebuilding projects the aim is to build peace through 
building liberal states. Paris (2004: ix) argues that there has been one common strategy for all 
peacebuilding projects in post-conflict societies in the 1990s; immediate democratisation and 
marketisation. As such, the liberal peace is not a neutral response to specific needs and 
requirements, but rather a political project, to be discussed below, with political, theoretical 
and practical implications. 
 
One could thus argue that the peacebuilding project today takes place as a “unspoken 
consensus” between international actors, the UN, international financial institutions and 
NGOs to construct a liberal peace “as a third generation response
29
 to post-Cold War 
conflicts, many of which revolved around collapsed or fragile state in the terminology of the 
day (meaning any non-liberal state that was subject to conflict)” (Richmond, 2008: 105). This 
form of liberal peace engagements has received criticism of having flawed preconceptions of 
the societies they engage in. It is not their intentions, but rather the theoretical assumption 
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shaping such engagements, which poses contradictions in the liberal peace agenda (Liden, 
2009:1). As Lidén (2009) argues, it is not what liberal peacebuilding promotes, but rather the 
discontinuity between the objective and the impact of liberal peacebuilding, what liberal 
peacebuilding does not address, with conceptual, empirical and practical consequences. 
 
The liberal peace is a discourse and framework presenting a specific ontology and 
methodology, as this study argues. One of the main contradictions in how liberal thinking 
explains the liberal peace is that it is presented as universal built on a universal normative 
ideal of economic, political and social institutionalization of cooperation, regulation and 
governance and an idea of fulfilling human needs. Moreover, Richmond (2008: 9; 94; 96) 
there exists no alternative to the liberal peace in the current discourse – nor is it visible in 
practice. Richmond and Franks (2009: 188) explains how “liberal peacebuilding 
automatically assumes it carries the technical and normative legitimacy to bring peace – 
although this is a western, liberal, state-centric narrative of peace with all of its related ethical 
meta-narratives”. Embedded in the Western liberal paradigm the normative framework for 
peacebuilding is based on perceived universal values. An assumed acceptance of peace means 
a liberal peace building on political and economic liberalisation through democracy and a 
free-market economy. According to Richmond (2008: 127) this paradigm is linked to the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony of a “single dominant notion of peace”.  As a consequence 
of this dominating discourse the conceptualisation of liberal peace has shaped most forms of 
engagement in peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction, what Richmond (2008: 105) 
describes the “peacebuilding consensus”.  
 
The discourse, claiming to be a neutral, universal ideal and not concerning other possible 
approaches to peace, has inherent limitations for the potential of peacebuilding and the 
creation of sustainable peace. As a consequence, there is a lack of focus on peace, both 
concerning its conceptualisation and empirical dynamics. Peace, in the current discourse 
based on the understanding of the liberal peace, shapes the contemporary peacebuilding 
projects. The understanding of liberal peace then arguably has occurred within a Western 
context of liberal thinking building on liberal norms and values. In order to globalise the 
discourse and practice of peacebuilding it is necessary to open up for a critical discourse on 
peace opens up for clarifications on the environment and the structures that current 





The superiority of the liberal state model as an environment for peace also implies a lack of 
connection with the local environment and complex conflict dynamics, despite the 
emancipatory change based on local structures that the liberal peace aims to create (Richmond 
and Franks, 2009: 190). “Liberalism offers a version of peace that is plausible within a liberal 
state and between liberal states, as well as a model to replace failed or non-liberal systems. As 
a result a far more complex version of peace has emerged, irrespective of  strong realist 
opposition on ideological and theoretical grounds” (Richmond, 2008: 93). Richmond (2008: 
95; 96) further states that the discourse and epistemological approach of the liberal peace “has 
led to a methodological approach which legitimates this transferral of peace – often with little 
regard for local context and the social, political and economic system of its recipients” and is 
unable to prevent poverty or address inequality in sustainable ways. This calls attention to 
methodological and empirical challenges with the liberal peace. Equality and social justice is 
not a key issue when dealing with peace theoretically or practically, rather the discourse of 
security and stability constructs the international discourse on peace (Richmond, 2008: 14). 
The high value of institutional democracy in liberal peace has received critique for ignoring 
issues such as identity and culture, and accepting neo-liberalism as “the only option” 
(Richmond, 2008: 90). Likewise, the civil aspect of liberal peace such as agency and rights 
has to a certain extent been anomalies in IR (Richmond, 2008: 94). 
 
Building on these arguments, the dominant focus of the liberal peace in practice is to a 
significant degree reduced to security and state institutions. This is another aspect of the 
liberal peace which represents the inherent contradictions of its framework, and practice. The 
emancipatory claims of the liberal peace pose a great contradiction.  Current liberal 
peacebuilding projects are theoretically grounded in a “new humanitarianism”, sensitive to 
local dynamics and potential, and careful not to create external dependency. This presents a 
paradox as Richmond and Franks (2009: 5) highlights; “Often, though, the priority is the 
international or regional dynamics of the liberal peace rather than its local quality”. Richmond 
and Franks (2009: 13) argue that the emancipatory “component” of the liberal peace 
legitimates the peacebuilding project in theory. However, they argue, forms of emancipation 
has not emerged in practice. There is a need for greater awareness of the subjective ontology 
of peace covered by the objective and universal peace that the dominating discourse presents 




practical consequences. There is a discontinuity in the liberal peace between the objectives 
and the impact of peacebuilding, as Lidén (2009) also emphasises. This could represent an 
impediment to long-term sustainable and emancipatory peace. 
 
Peace operations as such serve a narrow, problem-solving agenda which reinforce the existing 
power relations and knowledge relations in IR. The inherent values and structures sustain a 
particular form of global governance and norms and a particular ideology of good governance 
(Pugh, 2004: 39; 41; 53). The aim of creating such a peace with a predisposed intention 
should be questioned as well as the aim of liberal peace as taken for granted and as given, 
“dependent prior to and independently of the political process” (Eriksen, 2009: 16). Here, 
Richmond (2008: 131) states how critical theory “produces a powerful critique of the liberal 
peace and its underlying liberal-realist problem solving framework”. By questioning the 
ontological “subjective nature of peace [which] disguises ideology, hegemony, driving 
practices and marginalisation” which is a reflection of the liberal hegemony in the current 
world system, a deconstruction of the meta-narrative of power and knowledge takes places  
challenging the methodological approach to how knowledge about peace is assessed 
(Richmond, 2008: 5; 7). Critical theory thus proposes a more sophisticated conceptualisation 
of peacebuilding through its post-positivist methodology.  
 
The critique of the liberal peace underlines the possibility and desirability of establishing a 
liberal-democratic state as “taken for granted”. These assumptions have implications for 
theory and politics when it comes to perceiving peace and the state to be built (Eriksen, 2009: 
5). A critical theorisation of peace in IR views the dominant discourse of peace as a “liberal-
realist methodology and ontology connected to positivist
30
 views of IR” (Richmond, 2008: 6; 
13). This notion of peace includes law, civil society, democracy and trade, and arguably is a 
top down universally claimed notion of peace. Consequently, this understanding poses 
inherent flaws and problems particularly when theorising about peace on a universal scale 
(Richmond 2008: 13).  
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2.5.3 The nexus of peacebuilding and statebuilding 
 
Moreover, and central here, is the emergence of complex peace operations that have led to an 
integration of peacebuilding and statebuilding (Richmond and Franks, 2009:1).  Richmond 
and Franks (2009: 182) defines the statebuilding agenda as “focused on political, economic 
and security architecture, and determines its outcomes as a neoliberal, sovereign and 
territorial state”. Statebuilding contrast peacebuilding, the latter focusing on “the needs and 
rights of individuals, on sustainable communities and on the requirements for a self-sustaining 
polity of equitable representation without placing sovereignty, territory and the institutions of 
the state before that of the mundane needs of everyday life” (Richmond and Franks (2009: 
182).  The latter has been the foundation for the UN and international community‟s interest in 
peace processes, peace operations, peacebuilding, human rights and development. However, 
this had led to a “compromise agenda between statebuilding and peacebuilding, now known 
as liberal peacebuilding. It now tends to veer towards statebuilding approaches, but uses 
peacebuilding a framework for its legitimation, resulting in the uncomfortable compromises 
of liberal peacebuilding” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 182).  
 
Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 10) argue that a broad range of peacebuilding activities 
and a core focus on building institutions based on market economies and democracy leads to 
the description of current peacebuilding as liberal peacebuilding. Further they argue 
(Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: 10), “the theoretical underpinning of liberal 
peacebuilding is the liberal peace: the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies 
will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international 
relations, than illiberal states are” and the idea that  
 
liberal constituted states are more internally peaceful, prosperous and humane 
and even better environmental managers than non-democracies. Indeed, the 
international and domestic versions of liberal peace theory have recently blended 
into far-reaching claims about the manifold peace-producing benefits of 






Some aspects of contemporary statebuilding could pose challenges to promoting peace, at 
least not a sustainable and emancipatory peace building on local capacities. The statebuilding 
process is a long-term project, as is peacebuilding. However, statebuilding fails to build a 
social contract and viable solutions to sustainable peace (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 181; 
190). The nature of the liberal peace and the focus is not on the citizens but rather on building 
a state. Rather, the result has been on politics as a zero-sum game as well as a weak 
democratic process. Richmond and Frank (2009: 186) uses a case study on Cambodia as an 
example: “The peacebuilding process merged into statebuilding, which in turn became a 
vehicle for elite competition, not to mention corruption, at the expense of civil society and 
local populations, all clearly within the gaze of international actors”. Examples of long-term 
liberal peacebuilding projects have moreover shown limited effect on institutions, 
developments and human security, due to embracing statebuilding elements. Richmond and 
Franks (2009: 181) state: “The elision of the two terms peacebuilding and statebuilding has 
legitimated statebuilding practices of a top-down, externally driven nature, whereupon their 
problems have actively discredited the broader agendas of peacebuilding at the expense of the 
local, its everyday context, the customary, and of hybridity”.  
 
The liberal peacebuilding must also be placed within the context of the ontology of orthodox 
IR, namely the ontology of the state. Threats to international peace and security have to a 
certain extent been focused down to weak or failing states
31
 (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 
2009: 10). Particularly post 9/11 underdevelopment and state failure has received a lot of 
attention as threats to international peace and security. The current peacebuilding project 
should be contextualised within this specific and limited paradigm of externally driven 
agendas for what supposedly creates peace and security, but rather ignores the fact that such 
top-down peace and statebuilding projects not necessarily has a legitimate potential for 
creating peace or a functioning state. 
 
Several empirical experiences have emphasised how the “universal” understanding of peace, 
rule of law, democracy and economic liberalisation are not necessarily globally applicable, 
such as in the DRC, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan (Richmond, 2008: 1). Rather, 
the liberal peace represents the potential of an environment that could be far from leading 
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conflict ridden states towards a peaceful solution. As Richmond and Franks (2009: 12) state, 
“liberal peacebuilding processes have created very weak states that have been capable of 
providing limited security with international assistance, and institutions with similar 
international support”. Richmond (2008: 106) also describes the result of the liberal 
peacebuilding as “the shell of the liberal state” and Richmond and Franks (2009: 12) “quasi-
liberal statehood” and a “virtual liberal peace”. It is not a hybrid between the liberal and the 
local, but rather a “virtual peace hybrid” (Richmond and Franks 2009: 191). Paris (2004: ix) 
argues how the strategy of immediate democratisation and marketisation which underlies 
contemporary peacebuilding can have damaging and destabilising effect and not necessarily 
be the answer to internal conflict. The practical consequences of the strategies and 
implementation of the current liberal peacebuilding efforts should therefore not be 
undermined. The response to such challenges in peacebuilding has rather been of technical 
nature, rather than questioning the liberal peace itself and going beyond inherent assumptions 
about the current peace agenda, which might pose inherent obstacles for sustainable peace. 
 
Newman (2009: 30) argues that linking the peacebuilding project to statebuilding poses 
sensitive normative and ethical questions; “if peacebuilding is state-building, which (or 
whose) vision of the state is being used? In practice, the assumption has been for institutions 
that resemble the Western secular notion of the “state” – based upon liberal values – which is 
not something that is unquestionably accepted in all contexts as legitimate or appropriate”. 
Paris (2004) and Richmond and Frank (2009: 190) go further to argue that either more time is 
required for the liberal peace project – or it might be “terminally unsuited to non-liberal, non-
western and non-developed environments”. Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 12) argues 
that “the tenets of liberal peacebuilding – liberal democracy, liberal human rights, market 
values, the integration of societies into globalization and the centralized secular state – are not 
necessarily universal (or universally applicable) values. Moreover, the liberal peace and its 
neo-liberal economic dimensions, which have displaced older liberal ideas about welfare, are 
not necessarily appropriate for conflicted or divided societies. Indeed, democracy and the 
market are arguably adversarial or even conflictual forces – taken for granted in stable 





2.5.4 Peacebuilding as a political project 
 
Richmond (2008), Duffield (2001: 11), Pugh (2003), Paris (2004) and Newman (2009) argue 
that the liberal peacebuilding is a political project. The idea of earlier “traditional 
peacekeeping operations” as neutral where the outcome of the transition from conflict to 
peace was not the concern, and seen as apolitical, is challenged by the development of 
complex peace operations, in particular peace building (Pugh, 2003: 110; Newman, Paris and 
Richmond, 2009: 12). Complex peace operations and peacebuilding bring out ethical, 
normative and particularly political elements to a much larger extent than traditional 
peacekeeping operations. The political objective of peacebuilding operations since the end of 
the Cold War has been to build liberal states through the promotion of democracy, human 
rights and free markets (Paris, 2004).  
 
The argument of a contemporary peacebuilding as politicised is grounded in its focus on 
restructuring society and state from the ground, building on a liberal understanding of peace. 
The free market is a political project, not an economic as such (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 
2008: 4). A particular world order is perpetuated through given truths about what building 
peace should consist of. The extensive control and guidance by external actors construct a 
liberal regime which illustrates an external construction of peace (Richmond, 2008: 106). A 
critical approach to the liberal peace claims that such approaches to peace are western-driven 
external processes driven by political agendas and embedded in the UN system and peace 
operations. Interestingly, Lidén (2009: 3) argues that scholars, in contrast to Kant‟s idea of 
liberalism, see current peace operations as coming from the outside, in the form of top-down
32
 
governance based on western norms. Richmond (2008: 106) further argues that the discourse 
on peacebuilding highlights governance and top-down thinking about peace, not bottom-up 
“as originally envisaged” in the Kantian sense. The attempts for reform of liberal-democratic 
free market frameworks, human rights and the rule of law in peacebuilding illustrate this 
argument. Newman (2009: 42) also argues how “the reality of peacebuilding is that it is 
essentially political: in terms of local political culture and the balance of power amongst 
elites, and in terms of international politics relation to the interests of powerful states whose 
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support is essential for the success of peacebuilding”. Thus, peacebuilding is not only political 
in a top-down external manner, but also locally. 
 
Pugh (2003: 11) claims that “peace operations contribute to an ideology of world order that 
reflects and legitimizes neoliberal values, state-centrism and the economic structure of the 
international system”. Thus, peace operations are a significant part of the universal liberal 
peace and importantly the maintenance of a particular order of world politics (Duffield, 2001). 
Pugh (2004) argues that by applying critical theory to peace operations it is revealed that such 
peace processes serve a narrow and problem-solving purpose perpetuating the dysfunctional 
aspects in the world order and the privileges of rich and powerful states. The replication of 
normative and ideological assumptions enables dominant states to manage the system in their 
own image. Peace operations and humanitarian missions are weighed down with values in 
reproducing, or attempting to reproduce, the state system and liberal norms of domestic 
governance (Pugh, 2004: 54). These attempts are linked to the liberal peace where 
interveners‟ peace operation personnel, NGOs and donors focus on democratisation, human 
rights, development and economic reform (Richmond, 2008: 105). Establishing values of a 
market economy and political liberalisation clearly represents global liberal governance 
(Pugh, 2004: 41). The understanding of the liberal peace is thus reflected as governance. This 
approach underlines the liberal objectives, which are fundamental for the understanding of 
liberal peace, however such objectives might not be suitable to those outside “the developed 
world” (Richmond, 2008: 13; 96). The peacebuilding project is thus part of a global 
governance, top-down and elite-led official process. 
 
Again, we see the inherent fundamental contradictions in current peacebuilding which aims at 
building a specific kind of peace; the liberal peace, implying democracy, privatisation and a 
market driven economy, built on neo-liberal values and practices (Taylor, 2007). The liberal 
state based on democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights, good governance, market 
economy through establishment of “a government of national unity, capacity building, 
training of officials, financial support and human resources” illustrates an idea of a 
universally applicable state which assumptions are often not compatible with the situation in 
conflict areas (Eriksen, 2009: 15). As Taylor (2007) argues, assumptions about the African 
state and its potential for a liberal peace are flawed, possibly posing an impediment for a 




liberal peace within Africa, highlighting the inherent and profound contradiction of the two. 
He (2009: 562) explains how “the empirical state in most of Africa does not conform to 
Western conceptions of the Weberian state, something which is a given within the liberal 
peace. (...) Equally problematic, however, is the fact that enforcing the basic liberal 
democratic rights in Africa would mean reviewing and replacing practically every 
government in Africa”.  Moreover, the state is given a dominant role in the construction of the 
liberal peace, controlling society and economic development (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 
2008: 2). This has inherent contradictions as peacebuilding and statebuilding goes hand in 
hand, often ignoring issues such as social justice and an emancipatory and long-term 
sustainable peace. 
 
2.5.5 Linking theory and practice 
 
The current dominating approach to peace, the liberal peace, has also been called an 
“underdevelopment of the concept of peace” (Richmond, 2008). This underdevelopment, in 
addition to the academic debates, creates a demand for connecting research and policy. The 
existing critiques of the concept of peacebuilding, and the alternatives proposed, have had 
relatively little theoretical influence, however importantly very little policy influence 
(Richmond, 2008: 15). By introducing the theoretical findings to policy making and peace 
processes a potential for more sustainable peace opens up, by including actors and ignored 
assumptions or contradictions that orthodox understandings of peace do not include.  
 
Since the 1990s international peace missions focusing on peacebuilding have increased 
significantly. Peace operations, mediation and negotiation, development and humanitarian 
relief, and reform to meet international standards in the security sector, corruption, 
environment, border control, human rights and rule of law are largely based on the liberal 
peace embodied in the UN system and the post-Cold War international society (Richmond, 
2008: 14; 107). However, such international engagements have shown limited when it comes 
to creating long-term sustainable peace as discussed above (Richmond, 2008: 107). Extremely 
ambitious and normatively sensitive such projects have experienced great problems on the 




inherent contradictions of liberal peacebuilding have put forward the argument of liberal 
peacebuilding as a flawed approach to state building, social justice and sustainable peace.  
 
A clear deficiency evolves when linking peace operations to theories of knowledge in order to 
inform the debates in IR related to world politics. Moreover, there is a lack of critique on how 
the liberal peace influences policy (Pugh, 2003). As explained above, conceptual and practical 
development of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding have been in the 
spotlight since the early peace operations in the 1990s and been discussed widely within a 
problem-solving, technicist contextualisation (Pugh, 2004: 39; 47). However, linking peace 
operations to theories of knowledge requires moving beyond practical operations issues and 
relating peace operations to the larger context of world politics (Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2003: 
104).  Theories and knowledge open up for interpretations of world politics, as Pugh (2003: 
105) explains, “epistemological theories are like gatekeepers (…) restricting the scope of 
thinking about international relations” influencing ideas of what is legitimate or illegitimate in 
the agenda of world politics. Critical theory, as shown in this chapter, has the potential to 
increase the critical focus and discourse on the epistemology of current peacebuilding, in 
theory and practice. Such investigations open up for questioning the existing peacebuilding 
agenda, and the institutions and structures which dominate the current international system. 
There is a great need to advance the search for alternatives to ensure stable, long-lasting and 
emancipatory peace. 
 
2.5.6 Alternatives to the liberal peace? 
 
There is an evident need for a more reflective international role in peacebuilding. Richmond 
and Franks (2009) and Autesserre (2010) call for a modification of current peacebuilding 
projects and alternative approaches to peace. The liberal peace evidently has contradictions 
inherent in its top-down approach and might not be suitable for complex conflict zones 
outside the western world, as several empirical experiences illustrate.  
 
On the other hand, the inherent weaknesses of the liberal peacebuilding do not necessarily 
imply that the liberal peace is a failed project as a whole which should be abandoned. As 




universal (the desire for self-government, self-determination, democratic participation, forms 
of human rights, a rule of law and prosperity) but such claims mask much dissensus about 
their detail, contextuality and the mechanism of governance, control and power that put them 
in place for others”.  Eriksen (2009: 663) argues how “even if one accepts this model as 
normatively valid, the prospects of succeeding in creating such a state will be undermined if 
the nature of the state that is to be built is taken as given, prior to any dialogue between the 
external state-builders and those whose state is to be built”. This top down approach has 
undermined the legitimacy of the liberal peacebuilding project (Richmond and Franks; 2009: 
182).  Thus, there is a need to “see it [the liberal peace] as a part of an interwoven tapestry in 
which there are many patterns of peace, all of which share – if they are successful – high 
levels of local, regional and international legitimacy amongst citizens” (Richmond and Franks 
2009:15). To reflect on the liberal state itself, and its potential, is necessary to avoid what 
caused war in the first place. 
  
A top down approach, shaped as a political project guided by the liberal peace agenda, has 
created states and institutions which are more or less “empty shells of states” (Richmond and 
Franks, 2009: 190). Moreover, the argument here is not to reject that empty shells of states are 
better than conflict. However, these constructions have little potential for social 
transformation into a peaceful, just and sustainable society. There is a need to discuss and 
consider how current practices of peacebuilding mainly focuses on statebuilding and does not 
legitimise peace for the citizens involved (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 191). The ontological 
question rises of the liberal peace as transferable into non-western and non-liberal policy or if 
the peace that is built is a virtual peace where causes of conflict are left unresolved in a lasting 
socioeconomic crisis and fragile security situation (Richmond and Franks 2009: 13). A local 
contextualisation of the liberal peace has shown almost absent in practice (Richmond and 
Franks, 2009: 190). Deep rooted causes of conflict and complex conflict dynamics, often 
beyond state borders, are not addressed. Building a state and conducting elections does not, in 
itself, bear emancipatory fruits. Democratic processes are rather of a weak nature and politics 
takes place as a zero sum game, often hand in hand with pervasive corruption. It is not meant 
to disregard democracy, rather to see how democracy in divided societies can lead to 
destabilisation and stronger sectarianism (Newman, Paris and Richmond, 2009: 12).  These 
issues illustrate the internal inconsistencies and incoherencies in the liberal peace project 





There is a great need to rethinking the relationship between peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
This opens up for questions of the potential for sustainable peace that the liberal peace 
proposes. The restriction of the concept and methodology of the liberal peacebuilding is 
unclear on how practical and local forms of emancipation would look like is unclear, which 
underlines the subjective ontology of peace in theory and practice. Newman, Paris and 
Richmond (2009: 14) argue that more hybrid forms of peacebuilding should be explored. 
Richmond and Franks (2009: 183) argue for the need to search for a more hybrid form of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding “that can develop international approaches and consensus for 
peace, while also developing and assisting the localised dynamics for peace”. Whether the 
liberal peace is not compatible in non-western societies or whether there is a need for a long-
term process developing case specific hybrids is an important question for further research. 
However, the critical approach to the liberal peace is clear on one issue; if the liberal peace is 
to become more successful it must be based on “political agency for individuals rather than 
institutions” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 183). The potential for a more sustainable peace 
based on local dynamics, potential and emancipatory elements must include all peacebuilding 
actors also on a local level. 
 
The role of regional actors might propose a potential for a much more reflective international 
role in peacebuilding. These emerging international actors show clear leadership in their 
regions and have capacities and resources to engage and participate. Such actors could have 
better premises for analysing complex conflict situations and the local dynamics implied. 
Moreover, there might be a potential for regional actors to promote the local and to focus on a 
long term engagement where root causes and local dynamics are embraced to a larger extent.  
An inclusive framework which includes all actors in peacebuilding opens up for new 
questions for the discourse on peace. Such actors, with a starting point grounded more locally, 
could have a potential for thinking alternatively about peacebuilding.  
2.6  Conclusions 
 
Traditional actors in peace operations and peacebuilding, such as the UN, have received 
extensive critique for the approaches to complex peacebuilding projects after the end of the 




epistemological underpinnings of the liberal peacebuilding – in theory and in practice. This 
chapter has placed the current peacebuilding debates within a globalised critical theory 
framework aiming at making the discourse and practice of peacebuilding global. Further, the 
origins of peacebuilding have been presented as a backdrop for the further analysis within the 
post-positivt methodology of critical theory. A restricted understanding of peace through a 
restrained methodological and epistemological approach creates the need for opening up the 
discussion about the current peacebuilding project. Critical theory goes beyond assumptions 
about what kind of peace is promoted and unveils the uncritical given aim of creating a liberal 
state. The environment in which the current peacebuilding project takes place, namely a 
liberal environment, leads us to the inherent assumptions and contradictions of the extensive 
efforts for creating peace in conflict areas around the world. The explanatory value of critical 
theory thus contributes with revealing these weaknesses and unveiling how the contemporary 
peacebuilding project might not in its current form be applicable to non-western conflict 
areas, challenging the current ontology of orthodox theories of IR. The power relations and 
how knowledge about peace is produced mirrors how the liberal peace is seen as the only 
solution to current intractable conflicts. These findings illustrate the great need for 
policymakers and analysts to reflect upon the liberal peacebuilding project aiming at 
developing more conducive approaches for long-term sustainable peace.  
 
Empirical examples will add to the discourse on the liberal peacebuilding giving a more 
nuanced understanding of the current peacebuilding projects. Applying theory to empirical 
examples will underline the ontological, epistemological and normative aspects of these 
discourses “in an attempt to open up the conceptualisations and imaginings of peace as a 
serious research agenda” (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 2). The case study examined here will 
empirically ground the liberal peace framework. The two following chapters will examine the 
ideological foundations and environment which shapes the current peacebuilding project, and 
further to identify the structures promoted in such an approach by looking at South Africa‟s 




3 South Africa promoting peace in Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa has since 1994 increasingly positioned itself as an active promoter of peace and 
development in Africa. South Africa has transformed from what could be described as a 
negative force in the region during apartheid, to a partner vocal about its support for the 
prosperity of the continent. Throughout the last 15 years South Africa has gradually increased 
its engagement in several African conflicts. As the leading mediator in the peace processes in 
Burundi, the DRC, Cote d‟Ivoire and Sudan, South Africa has marked its significant role. 
South Africa has also contributed with peacekeeping forces and military observers to the UN 
and the AU peacekeeping missions such as in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan and Nepal and 
gradually taken on multifaceted peacebuilding initiatives, such as in the DRC. Evidently, 
during the Mbeki presidency South Africa has become deeply involved in Africa‟s peace and 
development agenda (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 3).  
 
Within a post-Cold War environment foreign policy challenges have shifted from traditional 
peacekeeping towards more complex and ambitious peace missions. Parallel, South Africa‟s 
policy towards the continent and beyond has changed. South Africa has made great effort in 
negotiation and peacekeeping, however the greatest challenges often arise after peacekeepers 
have left and peace agreements are signed. Empirical evidence show how groups often take 
up arms during or shortly after peace negotiations, particularly prominent in African conflicts. 
One prominent example is in the eastern DRC where the FDLR have persisted with their 
operations and the conflict has raged on despite the peace process. This has created a need for 
more complex peacebuilding operations, which has taken on the form of complex liberal 
peacebuilding projects, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
South Africa has, as an advocate of “the African Renaissance”, put considerable efforts and 
resources into building Africa‟s institutional capacity and architecture for peace and 
development (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 4). The AU and regional organisations such as SADC have 




a vital part of South Africa‟s agenda, building on the ideology of the African Renaissance, as 




Even though South Africa‟s role in mediation has been written about in length, few of these 
studies have provided in-depth information on South Africa‟s strategy or role in 
peacebuilding, as elaborated on in chapter one. These studies have also rarely been 
contextualised within a critical theory framework or specifically addressed peacebuilding. 
This chapter will, guided by the theoretical framework from chapter 2, proceed to look at how 
South Africa has positioned itself in policy and practice towards peace and development on 
the continent. Identifying the foundations on which South Africa operates reveals the 
environment in which South Africa engages. The foundations for South Africa‟s peacemaking 
engagement and more specifically its peacebuilding agenda will be clarified in this chapter.  
 
This chapter will proceed by firstly looking at South Africa‟s change into an African 
peacemaker and its motives for becoming an agent of peace, as a background for the further 
analysis. Secondly, how South Africa positions itself in its peace and development agenda, 
with a specific focus on peacebuilding, will receive extensive attention. Finally, the chapter 
will draw conclusions about South Africa‟s peacebuilding approach based on these findings.   
 
3.2 South Africa as an agent of African peace 
3.2.1 From apartheid state to African peacemaker 
 
There was a great shift in South Africa‟s foreign policy as a result of the transition from 
apartheid to democracy under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela. Geldenhuys 
(1984) presented South Africa as a pariah state under apartheid, and described its foreign 
policy as “diplomacy of isolation”. There is a general consensus in the literature that South 
Africa has gone from being a destructive and destabilising force in the Southern African 
region under apartheid, to portraying itself as a peacemaker and development partner after the 
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end of minority rule (see Adebajo, Adedeji and Landsberg, 2007: 22, Ajulu, 2008, Schoeman, 
2003 and Southall, 2006b).  
 
As Mandela became the first democratically elected president of South Africa in 1994 there 
was an urgent need for domestic change, transition and reconciliation. Reintegration of South 
Africa after decades of isolation, both globally, on the continent and in the region could only 
happen through re-establishing a comprehensive foreign policy based on international law and 
norms, and democracy (Landsberg, s.a; Mandela, 1993; Nathan, 2005). Mills (1994) argues 
how South Africa‟s foreign policy characterised by a hard-line interventionist destabilising 
role and “emergency” foreign policy in Southern Africa and beyond fundamentally changed 
focus towards common regional solidarity, democracy and development during the mid-
1990s. This shift was particularly important in changing its image from an enemy and 
destabilising force to a partner promoting peace and security in the region, however also 
finding a new place in international politics.  
 
These ideological tenets, focusing particularly on democracy and international law and norms, 
are presented in much of the literature as the base of South Africa‟s foreign policy 
characteristics in the Mandela era, described by Landsberg (s.a.) as a “principle-driven foreign 
policy”. The resurgence of Africa became a vital part of South Africa‟s foreign policy, 
reflecting a continental solidarity built on a strategy for finding own identity and strength after 
colonisation and exploitation. South African foreign policy under the Mbeki government from 
1999 onwards is seen as more or less a continuation of Mandela‟s legacy (Landsberg, s.a.; 
Nathan, 2005). However, when the Mbeki government took over, the foreign policy became 
more macro policy oriented, pragmatic-driven and more focused on regional partnerships and 
development, the African Renaissance, multilateralism, constructive engagement in conflicts 
and non-confrontational “quiet diplomacy”
34
 (Landsberg, s.a.; Nathan, 2005).  Multilateralism 
has been central in South Africa‟s African agenda oriented foreign policy and has guided 
many of its interventions in African conflicts (Kagwanja, 2006: 53) 
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South Africa‟s “identity” as a peacemaking nation, where peace and stability are pre-
requisites for Africa‟s development, particularly due to Africa‟s marginal position in the 
global economy, manifested itself through a broader continental and global agenda with 
engagements in channels such as SADC, the AU and the UN in particular, as well as 
bilaterally (Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu, 2003: 388; Landsberg, 2005: 734; Nathan, 2005: 364). 
Importantly, the investment in diplomacy has been a strategy to increase its regional and 
global importance, illustrated by its willingness to promote democracy and peaceful 
resolutions to conflict through building an African security architecture and participating in 
other multilateral mechanisms making an explicit link between development, governance, 
peace and security and growth” (Ajulu, 2008: 254). Scholars such as Ajulu (2008), Kagwanja 
(2006), Landsberg and Hlophe (1999), Sidiropoulos (2007: 7), Southall (2006b) and Taylor 
and Williams (2001) argue how South African foreign policy has, particularly under Mbeki, 
been guided by the South African inspired concept of African Renaissance, where democracy, 
peace and stability, and economic growth are the core principles of an African upswing as 
well as a promotion of African solutions to African problems. Kagwanja (2009: 4) argues 
how “the Pan-African Ideology of the African National Congress‟ (ANC‟s) „liberation 
diplomats‟, led by Mbeki and Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, dominated the 
Presidency and the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1999 to 2008, when Mbeki resigned 
from office”.  
 
These core principles arguably contribute to legitimising South Africa as an important actor 
both on the continent and in the international context (Kagwanja, 2006). Further they are 
arguably based on own historical experience of a peaceful transition and democracy. South 
Africa has met high expectations from the international community to become an engaged 
“agent of peace” through its own model of transition through negotiation (Ajulu, 2008: 256; 
Sidiropoulos, 2007:1, 8; Southall, 2006b: 2). South Africa‟s engagement in peace processes 
has been described as “peace diplomacy” through soft power, mediation and negotiated 
settlements (Southall, 2006b; Ajulu, 2008). South Africa has modelled its “peace diplomacy 
framework” on its own relatively peaceful political transition and has become a facilitator of 
national peace settlements. Thus, South Africa‟s role has been proposed as pivotal for 
Southern Africa‟s stability and economic development, with South Africa‟s negotiated 
transition at home as a model for ending conflict (Curtis, 2007; Sidiropoulos, 2007:1). South 




confrontation and inspired by own experience built its “peace agenda” partly on its own 
transition, where avoidance of military intervention, inclusion, and a transitional government 
has been important pillars.   
 
Post-Apartheid South Africa‟s involvement in promoting peace and security on the African 
continent was initiated by Mandela‟s engagement in brokering a peace deal in Angola in 1994 
(Adebajo, Adedeji and Landsberg, 2007: 29). Together with Botswana and Zimbabwe, the 
Mandela government engaged in preventative diplomacy encouraging elections in Lesotho in 
1994, and became involved in the OAU-mandated negotiations in the institutional crisis in the 
Comoros in 1998 (Schoeman, 2003: 362). Diplomatic engagements in peace processes, 
multilateral as well as bilateral, have taken place in Burundi, Zimbabwe, the Comoros, 
Lesotho, Sudan, Liberia, Angola and Cote d‟Ivoire,  and are strong empirical evidence of 
South Africa‟s involvement since 1994 (Landsberg, s.a.). In Burundi and the DRC South 
Africa has shown a particular resistance to military intervention, despite the military 
participation of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola in the DRC (Nathan, 2005:365). However, 
South Africa has gone beyond negotiation and facilitation and participated in peacekeeping 
operations, contributing with peacekeepers in the DRC and Burundi (Schoeman, 2003: 362; 
Schoeman, 2007: 98). Also, it should be noticed that as South Africa emerged as a 
peacekeeping actor in the mid-1990s its approach was based on a more militaristic orientation 
(Williams, R., 2000). The intervention in Lesotho in 1998 where the Mandela administration 
together with Botswana went into Lesotho with a military intervention to restore democratic 
rule illustrate a harder approach for promoting democratic values and human rights (Nathan, 




South Africa has gradually positioned itself as an emerging and leading actor in promoting 
peace and development on the African continent and beyond. South Africa has increasingly 
played a central role by attempting to contribute to conflict resolution, peace and development 
on the continent through mediation, negotiation of peace agreements, and increasingly 
engaging in complex peacebuilding efforts. It is clear that South Africa‟s engagements are 
built on ideological foundations such as democracy and human rights and through linking 
peace efforts with the general development of conflict areas and Africa as a whole. In policy 
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and practice South Africa has demonstrated that Africa and African development lies at the 
core of its foreign policy strategy on peace and development, as will be elaborated on below. 
3.2.2 South Africa’s reason d’être for engaging in peace missions 
 
South Africa‟s White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions (hereafter “the 
White Paper”) is the core document for South Africa‟s strategy for engaging in international 
peace missions
36
. The aim of the White Paper is (DFA, 1999: 5) “to describe the nature of 
contemporary peace missions and to provide clear and concise inter-departmental policy 
guidelines on South African participation in such missions”. The White Paper, developed in 
the late 1990s, can be seen as a normative framework for South Africa‟s strategic principles, 
policy as well as practice in its efforts in promoting peace and development, with particular 
reference to Africa
37
. Hence, this document is central also for the analysis of South Africa‟s 
role in peacebuilding as it clarifies the ideological foundations in which South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding efforts rest. 
 
The White Paper is a good illustration of how South Africa reviewed its own role in peace 
and development after its few experiences in peace missions in the mid 1990‟s. It resulted in a 
normative framework based on certain strategic main focuses reflecting South Africa‟s 
commitment to a broader peacebuilding agenda. The White Paper process illustrates the 
demilitarising of South Africa‟s approach to peacekeeping and further how it was “the core 
policy response to the widespread expectations that South Africa had to contribute to the 
prevention and resolutions of these [African] conflicts” (ACCORD 2007; Williams, R. 2000). 
The White Paper agenda is clearly based on normative values such as human rights, 
democracy and social and economic development. This normative approach illustrates how 
South Africa moves from acting as a peacekeeper mainly through military means towards a 
peacebuilder in broader complex peace missions, building on partnership and cooperation. 
Going beyond peacekeeping, focusing on long-term engagement and addressing root causes 
                                                          
36
 In 2005 the South African Department of Defence stated that an update on the White Paper will take place, 
due to the need for an update. However, to this date it has not been possible to receive any information from the 
Department of Defence or DIRCO on a possible reviewed White Paper. On the other hand, DIRCO presented a 
White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy in May 2011, Building a Better World: The diplomacy of Ubuntu, 
where “economic diplomacy” interestingly is one of the focus areas. 
37




in a peacebuilding approach gradually became the new niche for South Africa in its 
engagement with the continent and an extension of its peacemaking and mediation efforts.  
 
Three elements are highlighted here as leading accounts for South Africa‟s prominent efforts 
for African peace and development: (i) Its own experience of transition from apartheid state to 
a promising democracy; (ii) expectations for its contribution in the area of peace and 
development and; (iii) its strong base of resources compared to its fellow African countries. 
South Africa highlights in its White Paper (DFA, 1999: 19) that its efforts in peace and 
development in Africa and beyond are inspired by its own transition from apartheid to 
democracy.  The South African experience in conflict resolution through negotiation and its 
own relatively peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy has arguably a potential 
for inspiring other countries experiencing intractable conflicts.  
 
As a previously relatively negative force in the region during apartheid, during which the 
African National Congress (ANC) and others benefited from external support during the 
liberation struggle, it has been argued that South Africa has a “moral obligation” towards its 
African neighbours and for prosperity of the continent. As South Africa expresses in its White 
Paper (DFA, 1999: 19): 
 
South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how 
a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful 
transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of 
meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict 
resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this national 
interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable 
conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other 
peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts.  
 
In addition to South Africa‟s own experience, South Africa‟s increasing role in world politics 
as it emerges as an actor on the international stage has produced expectations for South 
Africa‟s engagement and potential. After South Africa changed from apartheid to democracy 
the international community‟s perception of South Africa has fundamentally changed. South 




respected member of the international community”, as a driver of democracy, human rights 
and good governance.  
  
Further, South Africa‟s own experience gives it a potential for influencing and guiding other 
African countries in their endeavours for conflict resolution and development. The White 
Paper (DFA, 1999: 4) highlights how such expectations have put pressure on South Africa to 
play a leading role in a variety of international, regional and sub-regional forums and that the 
country increasingly is an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and 
international conflicts. South Africa has been an active promoter of the AU and NEPAD, to 
be discussed below. Particularly during the Mbeki presidency South Africa has played a 
strong role in representing and promoting Africa, and the voice of the “South”, in 
international forums such as the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement and India-Brazil-South 
Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). These three elements thus remains standing suggesting how 
post-apartheid South Africa had to adopt to a new reality where expectations for its 
international role and adaptation to the existing international system were parallel to the 
expectations for the utilisation of own experience and resources in Africa. 
 
3.2.3 South Africa’s neo-liberal experience 
 
It is not the intention in this study to explore South Africa‟s economic policy at home or the 
expansion of South African corporate companies in Africa. However, the rapid growing role 
of South African businesses and parastatals cannot be ignored when looking at South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding role on the continent through a critical theory lens. The growing role and 
penetration of South African corporate businesses in Africa, which often has a close 
proximity to the South African state, takes place parallel to South Africa‟s prominent efforts 
to create peace. Kagwanja (2006: 30) argues how “South Africa‟s preventive diplomacy 
became inextricably linked to the ANC‟s post-apartheid neo-liberal internationalism”. After 
the end of apartheid the ANC developed South Africa‟s economic policy from an initial 




Kagwanja (2009: 20) also links the neo-liberal tendencies of South Africa‟s foreign policy to 




Economic calculations have driven the ANC since it ascended to power in 1994. 
Pretoria‟s elite has worked to transform the African continent, on neo-liberal 
lines, into a destination for South African exports and a fertile ground for 
investment. This mirrors the ANC‟s own ideological reorientation from its 
traditional populist and quasi-socialist ideas towards neo-liberal strategies for 
reversing the negative impact of apartheid and making South Africa an important 
trading nation. Its market-friendly economic blueprint, GEAR, adopted in 1996, 
also inspired the design of Africa‟s recovery programme, the New Partnership for 
Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). Partly as a result of these initiatives, South 
African companies have doubled their investment in the rest of Africa since 1994. 
           
Despite the significant shift in South Africa‟s foreign policy from destabilising to a partner, 
South Africa still is the economic stronghold in the region after the transition to democratic 
rule. Landsberg (s.a.: 26) states how “in just one decade since the establishment of 
democracy, South Africa has become pivotal to the flow of capital goods and people on the 
continent” and according to the 2004 World Investment Report how South Africa‟s trade 
increased 328 percent from 1993 to 2003. The legacy of South Africa‟s past and structural 
position as a relatively developed country compared to its neighbours arguably has some roots 
in the structural echoes of colonialism and apartheid, and is vital when analysing South 
Africa‟s role in the region.  
 
South Africa‟s historical role in the region combined with the rapid economic growth and 
expansion post-1994, have raised questions about whether South Africa‟s engagements are 
continuations of the exploitation and domination seen in the past, or whether South Africa has 
transformed into a strong participant that takes responsibility for its neighbours in the region, 
especially in the promotion of security and development.  The penetration of South Africa‟s 
corporate businesses and parastatals in the region, South Africa‟s dominance in the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU), in addition to the country shaping the regional political 
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economy through its domination in SADC clearly illustrates South Africa‟s strong role in 
Africa as well as its dependency on Africa for own trade and economic growth.  
 
On the other hand, South Africa can play a leading role for Africa‟s development due to its 
privileged position in areas such as standby arrangements and civilian and military resources 
(DFA, 1999: 21). South Africa‟s economic, military and human resources are significantly 
larger than in most of the other African countries. This adds to the expectations for South 
Africa‟s possible impact and its expertise with other African countries with fewer resources 
for such efforts. Landsberg (s.a.: 28) argues how South Africa, due to its African Agenda and 
its goals for African development should sensitise its private sector to play developmental 
roles, and not relate to the continent in the ways many multinational companies do.  
 
Due to South Africa‟s economic involvement in conflict areas, such as the DRC, criticism has 
been made for conducting commercial activities in troubled parts of Africa, which could 
contribute to the fuelling and sustaining of civil wars. Scholars such as Nel, Taylor and Van 
der Westhuizen (2001) and Taylor (2001) argue that South Africa benefits economically from 
countries in conflict, as well enjoying increased business opportunities if these countries 
obtain some kind of peaceful environment and during peacebuilding/post-conflict 
reconstruction particularly through its increasing complex peacebuilding engagements. 
Schraeder (2001: 233) argues that “a willingness to adopt the liberal economic model of free 
trade and investment has also gathered strength in the post-Cold War era, and has been 
especially invoked by the more technocratically minded Mbeki Administration (...) Towards 
this end, the South African government‟s close cooperation with South African businesses has 
yielded enormous success in penetrating the Southern African market, as well as other regions 
of the African continent and the world in general”. The White Paper (DFA, 1999: 20) also 
highlights how South Africa‟s political and economic development depends on Africa, an 
argument made by Mandela in 1993 as well (Mandela, 1993). 
 
However, the task at hand here is not to make an evaluation of why South Africa engages in 
peacebuilding, but rather to look at how South Africa engages in peacebuilding. Utilising 
critical theory, South Africa‟s own liberal structure, illustrated by its pro-market Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy from 1996 is likely to shape its engagement 




chapter now turns to looking at if these indications are applicable to South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding efforts.  
 
3.3 South Africa’s agenda for peacebuilding 
3.3.1 The foundations for South Africa’s peacebuilding engagement 
 
In the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 6) it is stated how peacekeeping missions have changed into 
complex peace operations: “In less than a decade, United Nations peace operations have 
evolved rapidly and in an ad hoc fashion, from classical peacekeeping (involving military 
interposition to monitor inter-state cease-fire agreements) to complex multidimensional 
interventions where the military component is but one of many participants within an 
involved peace process”. South Africa‟s own philosophy of participation in peace missions, 
described in its White Paper (DFA, 1999: 19) is concentrated down to two main areas, namely 
(i) the support for international conflict management and resolution and (ii) peace missions 
and national interest. In its strategy South Africa firstly highlights how its support to 
international conflict management and resolution focuses on addressing deep-root causes 
driving a conflict. As a basis for this focus, it is criticised how “resources and energies of the 
international community, regions, sub-regions and the national state are mobilised mainly 
around the symptoms of conflict particularly when these reach the proportions of genocide or 
civil war” (DFA, 1999: 19). Further the White Paper emphasises how “when addressing such 
crises, it is important to realise that they will recur if the underlying causes of the crisis are 
allowed to persist” (DFA, 1999: 19). As such, a vital part of South Africa‟s strategic approach 
to complex conflicts is that the crisis as well as the causes must be addressed in a sustained 
and systematic manner. This is in accordance with the liberal peacebuilding discussed in 
chapter two. 
 
The White Paper has a strong peacebuilding focus. Another aspect of South Africa‟s support 
to international conflict management and resolution is that peace missions are long-term 
endeavours, 
 
which include a significant investment in peace building, and not merely as short-




rights and political pluralism; the accommodation of diversity; building the 
capacity of state and civil institutions: and promoting economic growth and 
equity. These measures are the most effective means of preventing crises, and are 
therefore as much pre-crisis as post-crisis priorities. In all cases, peace missions 
should aim at the empowerment of peoples and be based on local traditions and 
experiences, rather than the imposition of foreign modes of conflict management 
and governance (DFA, 1999: 19).  
 
Further, a third element, governance, is highlighted in South Africa‟s philosophy for support 
for conflict resolution and international peace missions. Here, the importance of free and fair 
elections is highlighted, however with emphasis on the necessity of good governance going 
beyond transitional elections (DFA, 1999: 19):  
 
The greatest need for capacity building in conflict arenas is, indeed, in the realm 
of governance. While the staging of free and fair elections normally marks the 
transition to the post-conflict state, this state has little chance to prosper unless 
emphasis is also placed on the essentials of efficient and effective governance, 
namely: adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries; effective 
police services and criminal justice systems; professional civil services with an 
ethos of democratic governance; and the reorientation of the state and its 
personnel away from partisan interests towards developmental goals.  
 
The second area highlighted in South Africa‟s philosophy for participation in peace missions 
is how support for peace missions must be in line with South Africa‟s national interest. South 
Africa‟s own philosophy builds on how its own experience has informed strong national 
interest and experience in conflict resolution in complex and intractable conflict. The values 
enshrined in South Africa‟s constitution include “the encouragement of global peace and 
stability and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and 
development. South Africa‟s national interest, reflected in its foreign policy, is based on 
commitment to the principles of promotion of human rights and democracy, justice and 
international law, international peace and internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the 
resolution of conflicts, the interest of Africa in world affairs and to economic development 




about its commitment to human rights, democracy and good governance and loyal to 
international organisations‟ approaches to conflict resolution. It is clear that South Africa‟s 
strategy and philosophy for participating in peace missions and conflict resolution has a 
recognisable normative fundament linked to political and economic liberalisation. Moreover, 
there is a trust in the UN and the underlying foundations for international approaches to peace 
operations and peacebuilding, visible at least in South Africa‟s multilateral participation.    
 
Related to governance and capacity building, an in addition to acknowledging that holding 
elections alone is not the key to long-lasting peace, the White Paper highlights how “at the 
national level, democratisation has brought South Africa a greater degree of political and 
social stability, and has substantially improved the prospects of deepening and consolidation 
peace, security and stability within the Southern African region” (DFA, 1999: 6). When 
discussing the broadening concept of security, particularly in the post Cold War era, it is 
stated that the broadened understanding of security “has also led to widespread 
acknowledgement of the fact that appropriate response to ongoing political, economic and 
social instability must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and 
ongoing economic and social development”.  
 
Further, “South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in 
order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill over effects of conflicts in the 
neighbourhood” and support to conflict resolution and peace missions as a “prerequisite for 
international respectability” (DFA, 1999: 20). In general, “South Africa will therefore 
participate in such missions where there is a clear need for our national contribution and 
where there is a legitimate and realistic international mandate for executing the mission” 
(DFA, 1999: 34).  “In principle, the level and size of South African contribution to any 
particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to our national 
interest and the type of demand that exist  (...)” (DFA, 1999: 3). Also, the White Paper (DFA, 
1999: 30) highlights how “the foundation of South African policy on peace missions is one of 
national contributions to international efforts, whether these are at the level of the UN, the 
OAU, or SADC”, underlining how South Africa‟s national interest always is a motive for its 
participation. Furthermore, South Africa‟s policy has a significant focus on the African 
continent, where African peace and development is high on the agenda. In the White Paper 




below, as well as other regional economic communities, are essential for South Africa‟s 
capacity for participating in international peace missions. 
3.3.2 South Africa’s definition of peacebuilding 
 
The definition of peacebuilding conceptualised in the White Paper (DFA, 1999: 8) is as 
follows: 
 
‟Peace building‟ may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but it is critical in 
the aftermath of a conflict. „Peace building‟ includes activities such as the 
identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace and 
build trust, and the facilitation of interaction among former enemies in order to 
prevent a relapse into conflict. In essence, „peace building‟ is mainly a 
diplomatic/developmental process. Although the military might be requested to 
support this process, „peace building‟ does not constitute a military operation in 
the true sense of the word. 
 
South Africa has committed itself to a “broader peacebuilding agenda” and has, through the 
White Paper, a general emphasis on peacebuilding as vitally important for South Africa‟s 
efforts in peace missions and crucial for conflict resolution. South Africa‟s philosophy as 
outlined in the White Paper has a core emphasis on addressing root causes of conflict and 
promoting long-term peacebuilding, as argued above, expressed as: “South Africa would 
obviously prefer to contribute to those initiatives that aim to address the underlying causes of 
conflict and not simply its short-term containment” (DFA, 1999: 21). 
 
As part of a long-term approach to conflict paying particular attention to root causes, South 
African policy underlines the shift from peacekeeping to more multifunctional complex peace 
missions and how “with the change of function, scope and size (...) the distinction between 
political, military and humanitarian tasks in the pursuit of peace has become blurred” (DFA, 
1999: 9). Consequentially such missions are carried out in support of political objectives. The 
White Paper underscores how “contemporary peace missions are fundamentally political 
initiatives, despite the complex admixture of political, humanitarian and military concerns and 




environment within which peace missions are to be launched and the principles governing 
South African participation in such efforts” (DFA, 1999: 4).  Here we can return to chapter 
two and see the link to the explanation of peacebuilding as a political project with a specific 
agenda, based on a liberal foundation. Peacebuilding is a constitutional key component of 
South Africa‟s White Paper and central to the government‟s involvement in peace missions, 
and moreover normative in its orientation as well as strategy (Williams, R., 2000: 90). 
 
3.3.3  African solutions for building African peace? 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa has increasingly focused its foreign policy on Africa and shown a 
dedication to supporting conflict resolution in unstable areas on the continent. During the 
Mandela-era, South Africa‟s foreign policy was arguably more of a unilateral kind, with a 
focus on human rights and the promotion of democracy to the continent, also critiquing 
undemocratic leaders and breaches of human rights (Kagwanja, 2009: 5). However, as 
Kagwanja (2006) argues, despite South Africa‟s strength economically and militarily, its 
capacity of promoting human rights and democratic development has been limited by 
suspicions of its agenda, critiqued for being “too Western”.  When Mbeki became head of 
state in 1999, South African foreign policy turned its focus increasingly towards 
multilateralism and the promotion of common African development. Developing Africa as a 
continent was to happen through an African Renaissance, to be discussed below, guided by 
commitment to liberal economies, foreign investment and the prosperity of the African 
continent. Emphasising South Africa as being a part of the African continent is central in the 
foreign policy, as opposed to pre-1994.  
 
According to The Department of Foreign Affairs‟ 2005-2008 Strategic Plan (DFA, 2005c: 19) 
“The South African Government firmly believes that the future of South Africa is inextricably 
linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbours in Southern Africa”. 
The Strategic Plan outlines how South Africa‟s engagement with Africa rests on three pillars: 
(i) Strengthen Africa‟s multilateral institutions; (ii) Supporting Africa‟s socio-economic 
development programme NEPAD and SADC‟s Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan (RISPD) and; (iii) strengthening bilateral relations political and socio-economic relations 




Continent are therefore the resolution of conflict and the building of a framework within 
which socio-economic development can take place. The entry points for achieving these goals 
are provided by the SADC, the AU and NEPAD”.  
 
Priority one in the South African Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 is “consolidation of the 
African Agenda” (DFA, 2005c: 68). The objective is to “promote the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and encourage post-conflict reconstruction and development” with the aim of 
achieving “Success in implementation of current peace processes”. Further, critical issues 
within this aim formulated in the Strategic Plan is: “the deployment of military personnel and 
equipment to mandated AU and UN peacekeeping missions”; “the role of South Africa as 
Convenor of the Sudan Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee of the AU”; “consolidation 
of the peace processes in Burundi, Côte d‟Ivoire, the DRC, Somalia and Sudan” and; to “use 
the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund to support post-conflict 
reconstruction and development and to generate trilateral co-operation projects”.  
 
South Africa has been promoting this multilateralism through engagements in organisations 
such as the AU and SADC, however also extensively through bilateral cooperation. 
Strengthening bilateral relations is one of the objectives under “consolidating of the African 
Agenda” through “facilitating institutional capacity building as part of post-war 
reconstruction and development in Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Somalia and the Sudan” 
(DFA, 2005c: 71).Landsberg (s.a.: 20) argues how “no other state in the continent has played 
such a pivotal role in post-conflict peace-building and development as did South Africa over 
the past six years in particular”. South Africa‟s strategy has advanced the proposition that 
there can be no successful peacebuilding without socioeconomic, political and economic 
development, and there can be no such development without peacebuilding. 
 
3.3.4 Building a stronger AU for African solutions to African problems 
 
South Africa has had a central role in strengthening the AU during the Mbeki presidency, as 
the AU was founded in 2002. It was based on setting up institutions in order to find African 
solutions to African problems in a more efficient manner than the previous Organisation of 




of the AU‟s committee on post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Southern Sudan, South 
Africa has further marked its commitment to strengthen the AU (Landsberg, s.a.). South 
Africa has moreover committed to supporting the Common African Defence and Security 
Policy and the Panel of the Wise (DFA, 2005c: 21). President Mbeki has also been heavily 
involved in the new African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. South Africa has 
contributed with significant troop to the SADC and the AU. In November 2008 South Africa 
ranked fifth of African countries contributing troops to the UN and fourteenth in the world 




Further, South Africa took on an active role in developing the capacity of the AU and also 
promoting norms and standards of governance to fellow African leaders (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 
4). For example, South Africa was one of the inaugural members of the AU‟s political 
mandate which is operationalised through the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC),  the AU 
organ for prevention, management and resolution of conflict (DFA, 2005c: 20). South Africa 
is also one of the main financial contributors to many of the PSC‟s initiatives; for example 
AU‟s first peace keeping operation, the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB), and the African 
Standby Force, where South Africa has been an active driver for a continental military force 
to operationalise the PSC (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 6).  “The PSC was created to, inter alia, 
promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities and to 
consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence (...). In view of this, peace-building, 
post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian action and disaster management constitute core 
activities of the PSC” (AU, 2006: 3). These extensive initiatives are illustrative of South 
Africa‟s deep commitment to peace and development on the African continent. 
 
3.3.5 The NEPAD vision  
 
South Africa was a central actor as one of five initiating countries establishing NEPAD, 
launched in 2001. NEPAD is AU‟s strategy and vision for Africa‟s socio-economic 
development and the modernisation of African states and regions (Landsberg, s.a.: 10). 
NEPAD is therefore an essential development programme as a part of the AUs strategy for 
moving towards a peaceful and developing Africa. President Mbeki had a significant role in 
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forming NEPAD as a part of the effort to lift Africa out of its marginal position in 
international politics and the international economy
40
. As Hughes (2004: 80) states; “as a 
document of macro political economy in which the South African president played a 
significant part in its conceptualisation, NEPAD may be regarded as the defining document of 
the Mbeki Presidency”. Accountability and good governance as well as economic 
development are seen as the core elements of NEPAD, as well as calling on African leaders to 
fight corruption. The African Peer Review Mechanism, launched in February 2004, is to 
promote good governance in African countries and steer the continent towards prosperity and 
is hosted by South Africa. The Strategic Plan (DFA, 2005c: 22) describes NEPAD as:  
 
A continental instrument to advance people-centred development, based on 
democratic values and principles. It commits African governments to good 
governance and to detailed programmes of action within specific time frames. It 
ensures an integrated approach to development needs on the Continent and at the 
same time works to redefine the relationship of the Continent with the 
international community, particularly the developed world and multilateral 
institutions.  
 
The principles of NEPAD are to be put into practice through the five main elements of 
NEPAD‟s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD) which are security, 
humanitarian assistance, political governance and transition, socioeconomic reconstruction 
and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation and, gender (AU, 2006). Further, 
the PCRD is a common platform for peacebuilding merging “the nexus of peace, security, 
humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding” 
(NEPAD, 2005: iv). 
 
South Africa through its contribution to NEPAD has made a development plan for Africa 
which is directly linking economic development with peace and security (Landsberg, s.a.: 11). 
South Africa has also promoted NEPAD in the G8, the UN, IBSA and G77. Hughes (2004: 
79) argues how “NEPAD is quintessentially a visionary idea in documentary form”. While 
setting concrete targets for the achievement of the UN MDGs, it is propelled by a vision of a 
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transformed African continent and a reconfigured pattern of African-global trade and 
investment relations. The ideological premise for NEPAD is squarely located within the 
concept of an „African Renaissance‟. The notion of renaissance suggests not just a rebirth, but 
a rediscovery, embracing and promotion of African precolonial values, culture, identity and 
pride”.  
 
However, scholars such as Landsberg and Hlophe (1999) and Landsberg (s.a.) argue that 
NEPAD is a South-African inspired concept and project and African ownership, which is vital 
for the success of the programme, has proven a challenge. Landsberg (s.a.: 4) also highlights 
how South Africa‟s African agenda, which has been put forward as a challenge to neo-
liberalism is critiqued for being too Western, not African enough and as neo-imperialist. 
Thus, many African observers and even some governments have been critical of the NEPAD 
programme (Landsberg, 2008: 12).  
 
The NEPAD programme has been criticised extensively by scholars such as Bond (2002) and 
Taylor and Nel (2002) for building on neo-liberal policies and not working close enough with 
civil society. Taylor and Nel (2002) argue how such an approach legitimises current 
international politics and its power relations and illustrates how maintaining rather than 
rethinking the current trading system in South Africa and in Africa is an impediment for 
peace and development in itself. Murithi (2005) has an interesting argument that the AU must 
develop an agenda more focused on the welfare of the people, and that development and 
governance strategies must change their focus accordingly. He further argues that home 
grown economic and development strategies must be made, mainly due to the lack of 
consultation with African civil society during the development of the NEPAD programme.   
 
South Africa has been one of the leading countries in the SADC. SADC is according to the 
Strategic Plan (DFA, 2005c: 20) one of the key implementing agents of the NEPAD 
programme, and “the primary vehicle for South African policy and action to achieve regional 
integration and development within all priority development sectors”. Moreover, the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, is a central vehicle for South Africa in conflict 
prevention and post-conflict resolution. SADC‟s Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan (RISPD) is particularly important instrument to operationalise the strategies on 




line with NEPAD and is the regional expression of the NEPAD priorities and objectives, 
which will ensure that the SADC‟s development agenda works in tandem with the AU” 
(DFA, 2005c: 20).  South Africa has, through SADC, been central in peacemaking both in the 
crisis in Zimbabwe as well as in the DRC.  
 
However, contradictions in South Africa‟s foreign policy are evident here. Being generally a 
promoter of human rights and development in its strategies and policies, South Africa has not 
been vocal on these issues in Zimbabwe. Here, President Mbeki has been vocal about the 
need for Zimbabwe to find own solutions to own problems. This could possibly be a 
counterargument for South Africa‟s western influenced liberal strategies. South Africa is 
attempting to find more home-grown solutions applicable to the African context. On the other 
hand, scholars such as Alden and Soko (2005) argue how the Zimbabwe case illustrates the 
limitations of South Africa‟s influence, and moreover the hesitation of critiquing a leadership 
under the subscription to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states. Furthermore, the split and power rivalry between SADC countries such 
as in the case of the DRC, where South Africa attempted to bring all parties to the table whilst 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola sent troops to support President Laurent Kabila, illustrates 
the two poles in SADC which has made the SADC ability to punch weight in promoting 
peace and stability smaller (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 6). However, and important here, South 
Africa‟s commitment to the promotion of NEPAD illustrates South Africa‟s strategy of 
linking peace and development towards the continent within a framework which seems to 
build on liberal structures. 
3.3.6 Promoting an African Renaissance 
 
The promotion of NEPAD is closely linked with the ideology of the African Renaissance. The 
African Renaissance is, according to the government of South Africa “an economic and social 
development agenda for Africa” (DFA, 2004a). It promotes social and political 
democratisation, economic regeneration and the improvement of Africa‟s geopolitical world 
affairs and an important foundation for the ANC (ANC, 1997).  
 
The African Renaissance has been described as Mbeki‟s effort to identify South Africa with 




Mbeki (Government of South Africa, 1996), then Deputy President of the ANC, spoke about 
peace and prosperity in Africa in his famous speech I am an African in 1996 and how “Africa 
reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes”. Moreover, Mbeki (DFA, 1998) in his 
speech The African Renaissance Statement called upon fellow African leaders and fellow 
Africans to join forces against corruption, exploitation and abuse of state power: “The African 
Renaissance demands that we purge ourselves of the parasites and maintain a permanent 
vigilance against the danger of the entrenchment in African society of this rapacious stratum 
with its social morality according to which everything in society must be organised materially 
to benefit the few”. Moreover, in Mbeki‟s (1999) article “On the African Renaissance”, he 
states that corrupt and inefficient economic systems of governance must be defeated. 
Kagwanja (2009: 6) highlights how “a salient ideological feature of the African Renaissance 
is the mantra of „African solutions to African problems‟, now driving Africa‟s peace and 
security agenda and architecture”. The idea is how the issues of inequality, poverty and 
corruption require African solutions. Still, in 2011 Mbeki still underlined how “it is time for 
Africans to stop looking for solutions elsewhere. Our challenges are African challenges, they 
should be addressed with African solutions that come from within us” (Koopman, 2011). 
 
As such, the African Renaissance represents a vision for the continent to maintain systems of 
good democratic governance and promotes negotiated transitions towards a system based on 
democracy and rule of law drawing on the history and culture of Africa (DFA 2004a). In the 
DFA‟s 2003-2005 Strategic Plan (DFA, 2003: 28) two of the main objectives are; “to work 
towards the realisation of the African Renaissance through the promotion of the objectives of 
the African Union and NEPAD”; and “to promote and enhance international peace and 
security”, more specifically to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and post-conflict 
reconstruction and development with specific reference to Africa. In 2001 the African 
Renaissance fund was established with the purpose of enhancing international co-operation 
with and on the African Continent and to confirm South Africa's commitment to Africa 
focusing on co-operation between South Africa and other, particularly African countries 
(DFA, 2004a). The fund is aimed for the areas of; promotion of democracy and good 
governance; the prevention and resolution of conflict; socio-economic development and 





According to Landsberg and Hlophe (1999: 1) “the African Renaissance can be described as 
both a foreign policy culture and an emerging foreign policy doctrine. (…) It combines a 
philosophy – a view of Africa – with a set of foreign policy goals and domestic styles and 
politics entrenched in a set of political, social and economic relations”. Bongmba (2004) 
argues that Mbeki‟s African Renaissance is a call for liberalisation of African states and their 
economies as a response to African conflict and crisis. Taylor and Williams (2001) describe 
the African Renaissance as more than a wish list for African development. They state (2001: 
267) that “the call for a Renaissance requires commitment to some of the main tenets of 
liberal democracy, the neo-liberal approach to politics and economic management promoted 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the crisis in 
Africa”. This is illustrated by statements such as when President Mbeki expressed with 
relevance to the African Renaissance that “it is also pleasing to see the emergence of the 
African businesses, which in partnership with global players can bring African solutions to 
African problems”, highlighting the liberalisation of economies and trade as central for the 
African Renaissance (Government of South Africa, 1999). 
 
It is evident that Mbeki links democratisation and the practice of democratic ideals to the 
economic revitalisation of the continent. Taylor and Williams, in their insightful discussion, 
point out that Mbeki links his idea of renaissance to “global power structures that its 
proponents can claim with credibility that the values it represents have become self-evident”. 
(Taylor and Williams, 2001: 268). Kagwanja (2006: 40) claims that “just as Nepad is 
perceived as GEAR writ large for the continent, „African Renaissance‟ is suspected to be a 
thinly veiled attempt to realise South Africa‟s ambition for continental leadership”. Ajulu 
(2001) argues how the African Renaissance is a constructive way for Africa to find its place 
in the global market, a question which is more prominent in the age of globalisation. 
 
Ajulu (2008: 253) argues that South Africa has become deeply involved in African affairs, in 
peacebuilding as well as in economic development. Thus, South Africa‟s engagement has 
been shaped by the ideas of a liberal peace, as illustrated by South Africa‟s peacebuilding 
approach and the nexus of peace and development. The link between peace and development, 
and its inherent contradictions, in the context of the liberal peace is evident. Ajulu (2008: 254) 
argues how South Africa “seeks to advance development and economic growth across Africa, 




this end, its foreign policy makes an explicit link between development, governance, peace 
and security and growth. Under Thabo Mbeki‟s leadership, some of these ideals found 
expression in the concept of an African Renaissance. The Renaissance vision expresses the 
desire to maintain systems of good governance and to promote negotiated transitions to 
democracy and rule of law”. The above analysis calls attention to this view and supports the 
argument on South Africa‟s proximity to the liberal peacebuilding agenda.  
3.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has looked at how South Africa has positioned itself in policy and practice with 
regards to peace on the African continent. Analysing the contradictions in South Africa‟s role 
in peace and development one goes beyond “moral judgements” analysing the underlying 
foundations for these engagements. The chapter has illustrated, through the framework of 
critical theory, that South Africa‟s strategy to peace and development is promoting an 
environment where the liberal state is seen as the key to Africa‟s prosperity, with a core focus 
on promoting liberal institutions.  Further, this chapter has argued that the normative 
principles which underlie NEPAD policy and a philosophy of the African Renaissance shape 
the framework for South Africa‟s focus on development in Africa. These strategic approaches 
make up South Africa‟s position towards peace and development and moreover their nexus, 
namely peacebuilding.  As such, it is suggested here that the liberal peace shapes the ideas of 
South Africa‟s engagement in peacebuilding, which in turn can have inherent contradictions 
for the sustainability of the peace that is promoted.  
 
Little is evident on how South Africa pictures its own “African solutions to African 
problems”. However, it should be underlined that the rhetoric of an African Renaissance and 
finding solutions suitable for African conflicts and obstacles for development in the African 
peace and development architecture is present, and as such arguably is an attempt at finding 
new ways of promoting Africa‟s prosperity. This also applies to South Africa‟s attempts at 
influencing the international system through its engagement in international forums. South 
Africa has also, despite accusations of being too Western and neo-imperialist, abstained from 
criticising its fellow African states for human rights breaches and weak democratic processes, 
even though such acts is contrary to what South Africa has promoted in the AU and through 




political projects, and how it is essential to focus on root causes. However, in its strategy 
South Africa has a strong reference to international mechanisms and own national interest in 
the engagements. Revisiting chapter two these are two of the main contradictions in the 
liberal peacebuilding; stating a focus on local issues and root causes in strategies, however not 
implementing this in practice.  
 
On the other hand, the above analysis suggests that there are strong indications that South 
Africa‟s approach to peace, development and thus the peacebuilding agenda is based on a 
shared set of ideologies, assumptions, definitions, paradigms and procedures as Western 
actors, the UN and international NGOs share, based on the promotion of a liberal peace, a 
liberal state and a liberal peacebuilding. These shared assumptions where the liberal peace is 
seen as the aim of peace operations underline that the liberal peacebuilding project is seen as 
given. These projects are supposed to have a specific outcome, namely the liberal state.  Thus, 
a justification of specific policies and practices founded on specific liberal norms makes it 
possible for South Africa to promote a specific kind of peace, to give support to a peace 
constructed by international organisations and seen as the universal peace. Consequently, 
South Africa is promoting a peace that is built on the idea of building liberal states in the 
search for peace and development, despite its promotion of an African agenda. 
 
Critical theory shows how this methodological approach legitimates a transferral of this 
particular peace. Further, this can be linked to South Africa‟s national interest – an interest for 
international and own security, and prosperity in its neighbourhood for further economic 
development. South Africa‟s transition to a liberal state unveils the contradiction that its own 
transitional process has to a small degree led to emancipation and real social change. Peace 
and subsequently development are seen as a result of a liberal peacebuilding, in a problem-
solving approach, perpetuating the inequality in the current international system. This is 
despite the fact that South Africa in its strategy shows a clear awareness of the political nature 
that peace missions and peacebuilding are – however without questioning the underlying 
structures promoted by a specific environment. This suggested finding will further be applied 




4 South Africa’s peacebuilding project in the DRC 
4.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa has been a key player in the peacemaking in the DRC since its first mediation 
efforts by President Mandela in 1997. Through multilateral and bilateral engagements 
including several bilateral commissions, South Africa has been committed to finding peaceful 
solutions to the conflict as well as political and economic development in the DRC. South 
Africa facilitated talks between the government and armed groups until a peace agreement 
was signed in 2002. The following Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was led and mediated by 
South Africa with President Mbeki in the forefront. Showing a notable commitment to 
mediation and post-conflict reconstruction cooperation in the DRC, various South African 
ministries and institutions have been involved in peacemaking and since 2003 increasingly in 
peacebuilding (De Coning, 2006: 1; Khadiagala, 2009: 67).  
 
Several interpretations of South Africa‟s role in the DRC have already been undertaken
41
. 
What emerged from these studies has highlighted South Africa‟s capacity as well as 
limitations for creating change in the DRC. However, such studies have mostly focused on 
South Africa‟s general foreign policy or peacemaking processes, and not peacebuilding. 
However, the recent contribution from Swart (2011) is significant as it includes the DRC 
post-peace accord timeframe analysing gains and challenges for sustainable peace. As 
touched upon in chapter 1, there have also been few attempts at contextualising South 




This chapter will draw upon the frameworks in chapter two and three and through the tool of 
critical theory make a careful analysis of South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement in the 
DRC
43
.  Chapter two established the critique of the liberal peacebuilding and its inherent 
contradictions. Chapter three has established that South Africa‟s approach to peacebuilding in 
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general is closely linked with international initiatives related to the liberal peacebuilding. The 
indications for South Africa‟s approach to peacebuilding as shared with the “peacebuilding 
consensus” are strong.  
 
This chapter will illustrate how South Africa since the comprehensive peace agreement in 
2002 has shifted from a peacemaker through its negotiation efforts to a significant partner in 
peacebuilding in the DRC through a committed and multifaceted engagement. South Africa 
has throughout the last decade engaged, multilaterally and bilaterally, in a broad range of 
peacebuilding activities in the DRC utilising considerable efforts and resources. Areas such as 
democracy building, security sector reform, institutional reform and economic development 
have been central. President Mbeki‟s African agenda, which links security and development 
and where conflict resolution is seen as the prerequisite for economic development, has 
shown evident in the DRC (Khadiagala, 2009: 67). How South Africa has positioned itself in 
policy and practice towards peacebuilding in the DRC will be analysed. By contextualising 
accessible data such as official policy documents and secondary sources this chapter will 
investigate how South Africa has focused its policy and practice and not evaluate its 
initiatives per se
44
. Guided by a critical theory lens this chapter aims at establishing to what 
extent South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC is founded on the idea of liberal 
peacebuilding. Firstly, this chapter will make a brief return to South Africa‟s first 
peacemaking efforts in the DRC from 1997-2003 as a background for the further analysis. 
Secondly, South Africa‟s peacebuilding agenda in the DRC will be analysed in depth, 
including looking at political and economical liberalisation as the core of this agenda. 
4.2 South Africa as a peacemaker in the DRC   
 
“Since the beginning of the conflict in the DRC in August 1998, South Africa has played an 
active role in attempting to bring peace to this vast country and the Great Lakes region of 
central Africa”, according to South Africa‟s Yearbook 2003/2004 (Government of South 
Africa, 2004c: 318). As South Africa changed from an apartheid state to an African partner in 
the early 1990s the Great Lakes region experienced great instability. Post-colonial issues of 
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nation- and statebuilding, resource vulnerability and the lack of functioning regional 
institutions for economic integration and conflict resolution shaped the critical dynamics of 
the region (Khadiagala, 2009: 68). Moreover, genocide in Rwanda in 1994 created enormous 
challenges for the security dynamics in the eastern Congo. Radical shifts in the domestic 
politics in the DRC and the lack of regional leadership added to the conflict picture.
45
 The 
international community‟s engagement in the region at this time was also in decline, much 
influenced by what had happened in Rwanda (Khadiagala, 2009: 68). This created room for 
South Africa, as a new partner in conflict resolution, to step up to fill a significant role right in 
the centre of the Great Lakes region.  
 
President Mandela and thereafter President Mbeki became personally involved in the 
mediation efforts in the DRC, in addition to senior government ministers (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 
8).  However, already in 1997 South Africa made its first efforts as a peacemaker in the DRC. 
Then President Mandela attempted to broker a peace deal between President Mobuto Sese 
Seko and rebel leader Laurent Kabila. South Africa, with its strategy of dialogue and 
negotiation, opposed other SADC participants such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, who 
provided military support to the regime in Kinshasa in opposition to rebel movements 
supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Southall, 2006b:13). Already then South Africa 
marked itself, in contrast to many of its SADC neighbours, as a promoter of dialogue and 
non-military solutions to the conflict in the DRC
46
. Moreover, South Africa was a driver of 
including the DRC into SADC, due to its instability and the possible negative effect for the 
whole SADC region (Khadiagala, 2009: 70).  
 
President Mbeki became central for South Africa‟s involvement in the DRC. In the 
Renaissance statement President Mbeki (DFA, 1998) claimed how “the Democratic Republic 
of Congo is sliding back into a conflict of arms from which its people had hoped they had 
escaped forever”. SADC, despite its member states‟ disagreements towards the DRC, sought 
a ceasefire in the DRC through the Lusaka process with support from Western countries and 
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the UN, which culminated in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999
47
 (Khadiagala, 
2009: 70). Ajulu (2008: 260) argues how Mbeki added a new approach to South Africa‟s 
foreign policy and particularly to the peacemaking efforts in the DRC by his hands on 
approach. President Mbeki, together with President Chiluba of Zambia, made a second 
endeavour at peacemaking attempting to include rebel movements to sign the Lusaka Cease-
Fire Agreement before the first deployment of UN troops, MONUC, in 1999 (Curtis 2007: 
253). South Africa had a central role in negotiating and drafting the agreement which 
included a ceasefire and the deployment of an international UN peacekeeping force 
(Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318).  President Mbeki announced South Africa‟s 
commitment to a peaceful DRC, and a peaceful Africa, through committing to contributing 
with troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. MONUC was established following 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1279 in November 1999 (Khadiagala, 2009: 71). 




South Africa was later to emerge as a principal broker between conflicting interests during the 
peace negotiations, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD)
49
. These political negotiations 
between the Congolese government, the opposition and the armed groups were central to the 
peace process and to the transition in the DRC (Southall, 2006b: 13). As a host for the ICD in 
Sun City in 2002, South Africa helped to negotiate the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan 
troops from the DRC in 2003 and an agreement between President Kabila and President 
Kagame of Rwanda, illustrating South Africa‟s regional approach to the conflict. Swart 
(2008: 208) argues how South Africa was a significant partaker during the Sun City 
negotiations which resulted in an agreement between the belligerent parts. The agreement is 
described by South Africa itself as “a ground-breaking peace agreement brokered by South 
Africa” signed by the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda (Government of South Africa, 
2004c: 318). The agreement paved way for the withdrawal and disarming of Rwandan troops 
from the DRC, and the repatriation of the Interahamwe, the Hutu organisation responsible for 
the Rwandan genocide, and the Rwandan former army (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 
318). The final plenary session of the ICD took place at Sun City in April 2003 under South 
Africa‟s mediation and supervision. Here, the Global and Inclusive agreement on the 
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transition in the DRC was signed, consisting of power sharing between the main Congolese 
parties during the transition and a transitional constitution, with Mr Joseph Kabila as head of 
state for a two year transitional period (Government of South Africa, 2004c: 318). 
 
Further deepening its leading role, South Africa became the guarantor of the transition 
process. South Africa has played a twofold role in the DRC peacemaking process, firstly as 
the chair of the AU, and secondly as a UN member state, which has given legitimacy as a 
facilitator (Search for Common Ground, 2003). In these capacities South Africa was assigned 
the role of Third Party. The Third Party Verification Mechanism was meant to monitor and 
verify the implementation of the Global and Inclusive Agreement. As a guarantor, South 
Africa continued its strong support to the further deepening of peace and promotion of 
development in the DRC. As stated by the DFA (2006a), “South Africa places much emphasis 
on post-conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC having facilitated the signing of 
the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC on 17 December 2002. 
The signing of this agreement, for the first time, paved the way for peace and stability in the 
DRC”. From inclusive negotiations and political solutions through a focus on transitional 
government and elections, South Africa‟s role for stability in the DRC changed towards 
promoting and being a partner in a comprehensive peacebuilding process. 
 
However, as Kabemba (2006: 156) notices, the Sun City negotiations did not challenge the 
leadership of the DRC, focusing on agreements between the main belligerents. As such, the 
lack of accountability and a new political class perpetuated the vicious circle of the 
characteristics of the Congolese state, namely corruption, personalisation of power, and 
ethnicity. This is an important backdrop when revisiting the critique of the liberal 
peacebuilding, where local conflict dynamics and search for an emancipatory peace often are 
ignored issues. This study will now turn to analysing the principles shaping South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding engagement in the DRC, followed by empirical evidence supporting the 






4.3 South Africa’s peacebuilding agenda 
4.3.1 The principles for building peace in the DRC 
 
In accordance with the argument of this study how South Africa has positioned its strategy 
towards the DRC in its official documents, strategies and statements could unveil 
fundamental elements guiding South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC. Only by 
conducting such an analysis will it be possible to argue if South Africa is building a liberal 
peace in the DRC.  
 
South Africa has no official formal policy or strategy for its engagements in the DRC. 
However, South Africa, as addressed in the previous chapter, has exclaimed its strategic 
foundations on international peace missions in the White Paper (DFA, 1999) and through its 
commitment to the AU and NEPAD, inspired by the idea of an African Renaissance. These 
strategic frameworks are vital when analysing South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in the DRC 
as they spell out the principles in which South Africa bases its peacebuilding engagement, 
which again are applicable to the DRC. Further, the South African Yearbooks are important 
sources of information for reviewing the foreign policy agenda of South Africa with regards 
to the DRC.  
 
Peace and stability in the DRC is clearly stated as one of South Africa‟s main priorities in its 
foreign policy towards Africa. The prosperity of Africa, and of the DRC, is repeatedly 
mentioned in its strategies and official statements. According to the South Africa Yearbook 
2004/2005 (Government of South Africa, 2005:295) “South Africa‟s diplomatic relations with 
central Africa have been dominated by attempts to bring peace to the DRC and Burundi, 
thereby ensuring greater stability in the whole of the central African region”. Landsberg 
(2004: 169) and Ajulu (2008: 261) argue that South Africa‟s number one priority in the region 
is peace in the DRC. South Africa‟s strong commitment towards the DRC is reflected through 
three levels: its contribution to the UN peacekeeping force MONUC and its mediation efforts 
and military engagement through SADC; placing peace and development concerning the 





As discussed in chapter 3 South Africa‟s White Paper (DFA, 1999) lays out the strategy 
behind South Africa‟s engagement in peace missions, moving into the area of peacebuilding. 
The White Paper states that South Africa‟s strategy for involvement in peace missions firstly 
has a strong focus on peacebuilding efforts. A strong peacebuilding focus entails a long-term 
approach. Revisiting the definition of peacebuilding in the White Paper (1999: 8), “‟Peace 
building‟ may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but it is critical in the aftermath of a 
conflict. „Peace building‟ includes activities such as the identification and support of 
measures and structures that will promote peace and build trust, and the facilitation of 
interaction among former enemies in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. In essence, 
„peace building‟ is mainly a diplomatic/developmental process. Although the military might 
be requested to support this process, „peace building‟ does not constitute a military operation 
in the true sense of the word.” 
 
The White Paper highlights the imperative to focus on root causes of a conflict, not just the 
symptoms. Further, peacebuilding is to be based on local capacities, experience and 
knowledge.  The White Paper highlights how building a state and developing an economy, as 
well as conducting elections and building democracy are significant elements for South 
Africa‟s strategy for participating in peace missions. The link to international and agreed upon 
mechanisms for achieving peace and how, primarily, South Africa‟s national interest must be 
in accordance with these international mechanisms for South Africa to engage are also 
prominent. 
 
According to official statements with reference to the DRC, “The South African facilitators 
have been committed to framing peacebuilding and democracy as an inclusive and 
progressive (yet incremental) process” (Search for Common Ground, 2003). This process has 
been based upon basic values such as (i) increased accountability and transparency (ii) 
developing policies and practices and (iii) creating an inclusive, centralised government with 
a main focus on the peacebuilding process on development of democratic institutions, 
including democratic elections (Search for Common Ground, 2003). These above principles 
are all clearly linked to the liberal peacebuilding, particularly visible by reference to building 





4.3.2 South Africa as a peacebuilder in the DRC 
 
Peace and stability in the DRC is high on South Africa‟s foreign policy agenda, and a mutual 
partnership shapes the statements on this relation. President Mbeki has stated (DFA 2007c) 
that “there are a number of similarities between South Africa and the DRC. Our countries 
consist of societies in transition from turbulent histories. The DRC is at a critical crossroads, 
similar to that we reached following the historic April 1994 elections, which marked the 
demise of apartheid and the installation of a democratically elected government. We believe, 
however, that transitional challenges such as those faced by our two countries are not 
insurmountable”. Further, Mbeki (DFA, 2007c) underlines how “off course, we are talking of 
a partnership between South Africa and the DRC - not of South Africa coming to the DRC 
without the support of the government of the DRC - we must work as a partnership”, 
underlining the mutually beneficial relations which underlies South Africa‟s peacebuilding 
engagement. Here, we can link back to chapter two and the UN description of peacebuilding, 
where “concrete cooperative projects which links to or more countries in a mutual beneficial 
undertaking that cannot only contribute to economic and social development although also 
enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace” (Boutros Ghali, 1992). 
 
South Africa argues in the case of the DRC that the efforts of the international community 
should be a priority for South Africa in the DRC peace process (Search for Common Ground, 
2003). Here, the joint efforts of South Africa and the UN under the UN Chapter VII mandate 
in the international military peacekeeping efforts have the goals of training a new Congolese 
security force, demobilise militias and belligerents and integrate combatants into the national 
force or civil society (Search for Common Ground, 2003). Further, South Africa in its 
Strategic Plan 2005-2008 (DFA, 2005c) welcomes the cooperation between the AU and the 
EU on peace keeping in the DRC, as well as cooperation in Burundi and Sudan. “In this area 
the major challenge is that available financial resources are inadequate relative to the needs. 
Hence South Africa will continue to engage the EU at a bilateral level and in multilateral 
forums on Africa‟s efforts to bring peace and stability in the continent” (DFA, 2005c: 49).  
 
It seems evident that South Africa supports the international approach and mechanisms set up 
to ensure peace and development in the DRC, mainly the international UN mission. Johnson 




interests within security and economics, through its participation to MONUC. The proximity 
of South Africa‟s own interest, and in a wider perspective the African Renaissance, is evident 
due to the intimate economic relations with the DRC, and how South Africa in the White 
Paper highlights its own important role with regards to economic and political development 
on the continent. Furthermore, South Africa‟s efforts through MONUC contribute to 
strengthen South Africa‟s international recognition, as well as on the continent and 
furthermore South Africa‟s “moral responsibility” is essential for its vast contribution to the 
UN mission (Johnson, 2009). In 2007 the DFA (Government of South Africa, 2007a) stated 
that “given the magnitude of the task, it is clear that the reconstruction process in the DRC 
will continue to require international support. In this regard, South Africa is supporting the 
DRC by sharing its experience of engaging the international community and international 
financial institutions in the processes of reconstruction, development and nation building”. 
 
The regional dimensions are also prominent in South Africa‟s strategy as well as practice 
towards the DRC. South Africa‟s strategy towards the DRC is dominated by the fact that 
“South Africa‟s assistance to the DRC is informed by its vision of an „African Renaissance‟ 
of peace, stability and security, and sustained renewal, growth and socio-economic 
development on the African continent. According to Sydney Mufamadi, Minister of 
Provincial and Local Government 1999-2008 and an official South African facilitator in the 
DRC peacebuilding, the regional dimension of the DRC conflict is an important factor for 
South Africa‟s dominating role in facilitating the DRC peace process (Search for Common 
Ground, 2003). “South Africa‟s national interests are integrally linked to developing peace 
and improving the quality of life for all Africans. Therefore, it has been this desire to 
encourage regional stability and African solidarity that inspired South Africa to assume the 
role of a regional player in southern Africa and in the Great Lakes peace processes” (Search 
for Common Ground, 2003). Guided by South Africa‟s own experience of the struggle against 
apartheid and the challenges of democratisation, as discussed in chapter three, South Africa 
has gained considerable understanding which could be used to promote peace processes in an 
African setting (Search for Common Ground, 2003).  President Mbeki at the signing of the 
agreement between the government and rebel groups 29 June 2003 to end the war and create a 
government of unity, as a chair of the AU, said that “the rebuilding of the DRC will go a long 
way to ensuring the stability of the SADC region which will inevitably contribute to the 




session of the transitional DRC parliament (Government of South Africa, 2004a), Mbeki 
again confirmed how the engagement in the DRC is linked to African development, the AU 
and NEPAD: 
 
 We are convinced also that this experience of the reconstruction of the DRC must 
become an integral part that informs the strengthening of the African Union. What 
we will do with regard to the future of the Congo will tell the real story about 
whether we are serious about the objectives we have stated in the Constitutive Act, 
which resulted in the establishment of the African Union. These are big challenges 
that we face. They relate also to the New Partnership for Africa‟s development. The 
continent took a common decision that we must ourselves decide what is wrong 
with our countries and what is wrong with our societies.  
 
Moreover, the DFA (Government of South Africa, 2007a) stated prior to the state visit of 
President Kabila in 2007 how “the DRC remains one of the foreign policy pillars of South 
Africa's engagement on the African continent. South Africa's assistance to the DRC is 
informed by its vision of an „African Renaissance‟ of peace, stability and security and 
sustained renewal, growth and socio-economic development for the African continent. 
Accordingly, South Africa is committed to a strategy for post conflict reconstruction and 
development in the DRC that is aligned with that of the African Union and Nepad. Hence, its 
assistance to the DRC is broadly based on 3 key areas, which are: the security sector reform 
(SSR), institutional capacity building and economic development”. 
 
Revisiting the argument that the liberal peace is linking peace and development, governance 
and growth, it becomes evident that this link to a great degree has been expressed through the 
concept of the African Renaissance during the Mbeki Presidency. As such one could argue 
that the DRC becomes a “test case” for the peace and prosperity of the African continent. One 
could further argue how this represents a top-down view, seeing the DRC as a piece in a 
larger puzzle, where liberal structures are supposed to bring peace and development. It is 
however clear that South Africa is searching for developmental solutions suitable for the 
African countries and Africa as a whole. Nevertheless, these findings suggest how such 




peacebuilding as well as through the AU, SADC by focusing on NEPAD and an African 
Renaissance.  
 
Revisiting chapter two, Pugh (2004) and Richmond (2008) underline the liberal objectives of 
the current peacebuilding agenda. The normative framework for peacebuilding is based on 
what is perceived as universal values. The assumed acceptance of peace as the liberal peace, 
which includes a liberal environment meaning political and economic liberalisation through 
democracy and free-market economy, has inherent contradictions and limitations. As a 
concequence of its liberal ontology and epistemology, the liberal peace equals, or promotes, 
the reform of governance, building on liberal structures (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 4).  
 
Peacebuilding in itself is a political project, as South Africa itself describes. The White Paper 
(DFA, 1999: 4) expresses how “contemporary peace missions are fundamentally political 
initiatives, despite the complex admixture of political, humanitarian and military concerns and 
means. South Africa must therefore make a careful appraisal of the political and strategic 
environment within which peace missions are to be launched and the principles governing 
South African participation in such efforts”. This point to the fact that such a political and 
strategic environment, which contains the idea of a liberal peace, is more or less accepted by 
South Africa, at least in the case of the DRC and its multilateral engagement. This study now 
turns to looking at the bilateral engagement South Africa has with the DRC. 
4.3.3 The South Africa-DRC Bi-national Commission 
 
After signing the comprehensive peace agreement in 2003, DRC was in principle seen and 
treated as a post-conflict state by the international community. Autesserre (2010: 66) argues 
how donors changed their focus from security issues to economic and political matters despite 
the continuation of violence and instability, particularly in the eastern DRC. Further, 
Autesserre (210: 68) underpins how the dominating interpretation of the DRC as a post-
conflict state led to a certain ignorance of conflicts related to land, mineral resources, 
traditional power and taxes. This is a noteworthy backdrop for analysing South Africa‟s 





Multiple agreements between South Africa and the DRC were signed during the first years 
after the peace agreement. According to the South African Yearbook 2004/2005 (Government 
of South Africa, 2005: 296) South African officials visited the DRC in December 2003 and 
January 2004 to “identify possible areas of co-operation to assist the DRC with its post-
conflict reconstruction and development”. President Mbeki visited the DRC in January 2004 
during the signing of a General Cooperation Agreement (GCA) meant to promote political, 
economic and social cooperation between the two countries (DIRCO, 2009). From 2004 
onwards there was an annual summit in the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission 
(BNC) hosted by Mbeki and Kabila in Pretoria and Kinshasa, respectively. The Congolese 
Minister of Planning, Mr Thambwe Mwama visited South Africa for the South Africa-DRC 
Joint Ministerial Meeting in Pretoria in March 2004. The BNC was officially launched in 
Kinshasa in August 2004 to serve as a mechanism to strengthen, regulate and consolidate 
political and economic relations between the two countries (Government of South Africa, 
2005: 296). At the first extraordinary session in August 2004, President Mbeki was 
accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade and Industry, Public 
Service and Administration, Finance and Deputy Minister of Minerals and Energy as well as 
senior government officials (DFA, 2004b). At this session the two Independent Electoral 
Commissions also met to discuss the first Congolese election since independence, planned for 
2005.  
 
The BNC has been central in South Africa‟s engagement in peacebuilding in the DRC. The 
GCA laid the foundations for the establishment of the BNC. The BNC, according to 
statements by the South African government (DIRCO 2009) became a forum for exchange 
and dialogue focusing on post-conflict reconstruction and development, whilst the GCA has 
resulted in numerous bilateral projects within a broad area of cooperation.  The BNC will 
“create a mechanism through which the two governments can regulate political co-operation 
whilst simultaneously serving as a platform for the two governments to identify and 
implement joint co-operation projects” (Government of South Africa, 2004b). According to 
the Yearbook 2008/2009 (Government of South Africa, 2009: 252) “The BNC, which has 
been in existence between South Africa and the DRC since 2004, provides a legal and 
administrative framework to manage and implement a number of post-conflict reconstruction 
and development projects in that country. In the implementation of projects in the DRC 




Moreover, the BNC has “the overall objective of working for the renewal of Africa and 
creating a better world” (DFA, 2005b). 
 
The BNC‟s broad approach to peacebuilding in many sectors illustrates South Africa‟s 
engagement. The BNC consists of four sectoral commissions established to review the 
progress in implementation of the commitments between South Africa and the DRC. The four 
commissions are (i) Politics and Governance; (ii) Defence and Security; (iii) Humanitarian 
and Social Affairs; and (iv) Finance, Economy and Infrastructure (DFA, 2005b). The Politics 
and Governance Commission led by DIRCO and its counterpart was administered by the 
Ministries and Departments of Public Service and Administration and has been responsible 
for Public Service Reform such as assistance in public service census, anti-corruption, 
establishment of a National Institute of Public Administration and rehabilitation projects 
(Dlomo, 2010: 46). Further, the Humanitarian and Social Affairs commission has dealt with 
all projects related to social development and the commission on Finance, Economy and 
Infrastructure with relevant issues (Dlomo, 2010: 47). Home Affairs has also been involved in 
the DRC on immigration and population issues (DFA, 2005a). The departments of Defence, 
the South African Police Service and the Independent Electoral Commission have also all 
been engaged with their counterparts in the DRC under the coordination of the DFA.  
 
Between 2004 and 2005 32 agreements and memorandas were signed (Dlomo 2010: 45). 
During the first session of the BNC a Memorandum of Understanding on Economic 
Cooperation was signed, as well as one on Public Administration and an agreement for the 
Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investment. The second session of the BNC took 
place in Pretoria in April 2005. Here, issues such as political and diplomatic consultation, 
good governance and public administration, defence and security, economy, finance and 
infrastructures as well as further increased cooperation were discussed (Government of South 
Africa, 2006b: 316). South Africa has also been supporting the national reconciliation process 
in the DRC (DFA, 2007b). R25 million from the African Renaissance Fund was transferred 
from South Africa to the DRC by mid-2005 assisting the DRC with its reconstruction and 
development (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 317). This extensive engagement 
illustrates South Africa‟s efforts to build a Congolese state, through liberalisation of politics 





4.3.4 Political liberalisation as part of peacebuilding 
 
In 2008, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad (DFA, 2008), at the opening of the 
5
th
 BNC Ministerial Session, said:  
 
The RSA/DRC BNC is a framework for the formalisation of agreements in areas of 
critical co-operation for the mutual benefit of our respective countries. The BNC‟s 
activities encompassed areas of election support, security sector reform (SSR) 
covering integration of the armed forces and the reform of the Congolese Police 
(PNC), as well as the post-conflict reconstruction and development process 
(PCRD). Critical milestones, reported in the Fourth Session of the BNC, have been 
covered in respect of election support and SSR. Beyond the 2006 historic 
presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC, focus is increasingly on the 
PCRD process.  
 
One year later, DIRCO (2009) stated that “the overriding content of South Africa‟s current 
bilateral relations with the DRC is aimed at assisting the country to develop capacity to 
effectively manage its programmes within the framework of its own Post Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) programme.” Facilitating institutional capacity 
building as a part of promoting development is emphasised as a part of peacebuilding in the 
DRC, as well as Burundi, Comoros, Somalia and the Sudan (DFA, 2005c: 71). Democracy, 
including elections, has been one of South Africa‟s core engagements in the DRC. According 
to South Africa‟s Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 “The maintenance of peace and stability and 
assistance with post conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC remains a priority 
for South Africa” and further consolidation of the peace process in the DRC as well as 
consolidation of democracy in the DRC are expressed as main priorities (DFA 2005c: 10; 68). 
This consolidation is to be carried out through achieving full agreement by all conflicting 
parties and implementing these peace agreements and further through supporting the DRC 
elections (DFA, 2005c: 69). South Africa has been vocal on how the constitution is seen as a 
basis for the democratic elections that would take place in July 2006, however somewhat 
delayed (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 317). South Africa, together with the 
facilitator, former President of Botswana Ketumile Masire, has been a vital actor in “assisting 




the country for decades” through their role in promoting the new constitution (Government of 
South Africa, 2007b: 286).  
 
In accordance with the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria in 2002, it was 
envisaged that the DRC transitional process would culminate in the holding of elections in the 
latter half of 2005. To this end, the South African Government adopted a framework to 
facilitate electoral assistance to the DRC, primarily based on strengthening institutional 
capacity (DFA, 2005c: 71). On 19 April 2004, President Joseph Kabila released the Road 
Map consisting of a calendar of different steps of the transitional process, including the 
finalisation of a draft constitution which would culminate in the organisation of free and fair 
elections in September 2005. On 8 May 2004, it was announced that all the components of the 
DRC‟s transitional government had reached agreement on the provincial governors and 
deputy-governors. (Government of South Africa, 2005: 296). President Mbeki travelled to the 
DRC again in May 2005 for participating at the adoption of the DRC‟s new constitution. 
Three months before the democratic elections, in March 2006, the third session of the BNC 
took place in Kinshasa, where the elections, social development, decentralisation and 
education where amongst the agreements signed (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 285). 
These high level visits are illustrative of South Africa‟s deep commitment to the promotion of 
democracy in the DRC.  
 
South Africa has, in addition to the high level partnership, provided significant support to the 
DRC for the election process. A Memorandum of Understanding signed 10 February 2005 
ensured the cooperation between the South African and the Congolese electoral commissions, 
facilitation of co-operation and assistance to the electoral process. It ensured South Africa‟s 
contribution with logistics such as ballot printing and distribution throughout the country. 
South Africa also assisted with ICT support in the monitoring and counting process of the 
election, recruitment and training of staff and conflict resolution within the framework in 
which the elections would take place (Government of South Africa, 2006a; Buanews 2007). 
Additionally, a South African observer mission of 108 South Africans were deployed to 
observe during the general and presidential elections in July 2006 as well as for the second 
round of the presidential election in October 2006 which was won by President Kabila 
(Government of South Africa, 2008: 263). The mission concluded that the elections were 




bilateral discussions with President Kabila in Kinshasa. These were the first democratic 
elections in 45 years since the country gained independence from Belgium in June 1960, 
described as historic by South Africa (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286). After the 
elections President Mbeki congratulated the Congolese people and underlined how the 
election is "re-affirming their desire for a peaceful future in a stable and democratic state by 
holding successful Presidential and Parliamentary elections" and furthermore how “we [South 
Africa] stand ready to welcome them into the family of progressive and democratic states” 
(DFA, 2006b). 
 
Also, the DFA continued its comprehensive capacity-building project for the DRC‟s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation throughout 2007 and a Public Service 
census in Kinshasa was completed with further data capture in the Bandundu and Bas-Congo 
provinces (Government of South Africa, 2008: 263). South Africa also engaged in an 
anticorruption project for DRC public officials. During his visit to South Africa in 2007, 
President Kabila rewarded President Mbeki and South Africa for their extensive engagement 
in the peace process and transitional phase. Kabila expressed how “the government of South 
Africa invested so much to a solution to a crisis that affected my country for so long” 
(Buanews, 2007).  Kabila again visited Pretoria for the fifth BNC Summit in April 2008 
(Government of South Africa, 2009: 252). 
 
However, as Ajulu (2008: 266) argues, the power-sharing model for the transition in the DRC 
has been criticised. It was effective in bringing the warring parties together for the transitional 
government and period. However, politics in the DRC quickly returned to a winner-takes-it-
all approach, and a fracture party politics, not a model for ensuring wider participation and 
democratic values. Further, issues of nationality, one of the core issues in the conflict in the 
eastern DRC was not properly addressed when drawing up the Constitution (Ajulu, 2008; 
268). The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006) highlights in its 2006 report how 
corruption problems and governance challenges are treated as technical issues by donors, 
indicating that an approach aimed at the fundamentally changing the landscape of Congolese 
politics is needed. However, the ICG‟s 2009 report on peacebuilding in the DRC suggests a 
more structured security sector reform, justice system reform, governance reform, 





Security sector reform is closely linked to the framework of democratic governance. This is 
an area which has been significant in the peacebuilding cooperation between South Africa and 
the DRC. Already in 2000 the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) was deployed 
to the DRC to participate in reconstruction of infrastructure and train Congolese troops. In 
March 2006, South Africa extended its existing deployment of SANDF members to a total of 
124 (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286). These forces where to support the integration 
and military training of the armed forces of the DRC, including registration of demobilised 
troops and upgrading military centers. The Defence and Security Commission within the 
BNC has led the cooperation for military reform, including training of the Congolese Armed 
Forces (FARDC), through the ministries and Departments of Defence. The Department of 
Justice has dealt with justice reform such as integration of the National Congress for the 
defence of the People of DRC (CNDP) into FARDC, mainly from 2007 onwards. In 2004 a 
defence cooperation agreement and Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration 
Process of the Armed Forces was signed, which later led to an agreement on Practical 
Assistance to the Government of the DRC (BuaNews, 2009). Furthermore, the Police and 
Secret Services have cooperated on security sector reform.  According to the South African 
Yearbook (Government of South Africa, 2006b: 316) “the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) has worked closely with the Congolese police forces to ensure security and to assist 
with the integration of armed forces in the DRC. In addition, South Africa, Britain and the 
Netherlands formed a partnership to assist the Congolese Government with the integration of 
their army”. The South African Police Service was also engaged in training DRC police 
before the election in 2006 and was deployed in “high risk areas” during the elections (Dlomo 
2010: 58). In 2005 1216 SAPS peacekeeping personnel were deployed as a part of MONUC. 
 
South Africa‟s contribution to MONUC also increased from around 100 in 2001 to 1409 
troops in 2006 (Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286; Khadiagala, 2009: 72). In 2008 the 
SANDF trained former DRC armed forces, the Rapid Reaction Battalion, who became 
members of the DRC Defence Force with the aim of providing security and stability 
particularly after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission (BuaNews 2009). However, 
security sector reform has proved a great challenge in the DRC. In the east ill-disciplined and 
ill-equipped security forces have represented a threat to the civilians (Ajulu, 2008: 267. These 
forces have also been involved in severe sexual violence
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Revisiting Taylor‟s (2007) argument it is an inherent contradiction to attempt to create a 
liberal peace in an African nation, due to the nature of its politics and governance. Moreover, 
one of the main contradictions in the liberal peacebuilding is namely how this approach 
results in a weak democratic process and a zero-sum political game (Richmond and Franks, 
2009: 186). Despite South Africa‟s support for the Congolese democratic elections, the White 
Paper (DFA, 1999: 19) highlights how a post-conflict state will have issues of prospering if 
elections are not supplemented with a higher agenda of effective governance. This has 
evidently proven difficult in the DRC, despite the concerted efforts of the international 
community, including South Africa‟s extensive support.  
4.3.5 Economic liberalisation as part of peacebuilding 
 
According to South Africa‟s Yearbook 2007/2008 (Government of South Africa, 2008: 263):  
 
The DRC has made remarkable progress and presents real opportunities for 
intraregional economic co-operation, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
sustained growth and development. However, cycles of conflict have severely 
undermined both African and foreign-investor confidence, further weakened 
indigenous economic development, and increased dependence on foreign loans 
and assistance. South Africa is fully committed to continued engagement with the 
DRC, and to assisting the new democratically elected government with its 
consolidation of democracy, in line with its foreign policy objectives. South Africa 
has also committed to providing ongoing assistance to the new Government to 
reform the DRC‟s economy, and is supporting measures to encourage a 
predictable and stable economic environment to unlock investment and trade 
opportunities between the two countries. 
 
As a significant part of South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement, there has been a large 
commitment to assisting the DRC in its economic development and reconstruction.  Already 
in 2002, Vodacom, the leading cellular network in South Africa, was launched in the DRC. At 
the launch where President Mbeki was present, he stated “In many ways, this strengthens the 




reconstruction of the national economy of the DRC and, in this way, must also be seen as a 
part and parcel of the process of the socio-economic recovery of the African continent” 
(Government of South Africa, 2002). In connection with the launch Mbeki expressed that “by 
taking this important step, you have made a significant contribution to the realisation of the 
dream of an African Renaissance and the implementation of New Partnership for Africa‟s 
Development (NEPAD)” (Government of South Africa, 2002).   
 
According to Mbeki (2007c) “we [DRC and South Africa] have a duty, among other things, to 
strengthen our economic relations by enhancing co-operation among our business people and 
increase trade and investment between our countries, as well as ensuring effective 
implementation of current and future New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) 
projects, as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) programmes. We 
must work together to improve people-to-people contacts, including through cultural, 
scientific and educational exchange programmes as well as encouraging two-way tourism”. 
The role of the private sector and companies are seen as vital for Africa‟s development. Areas 
such as telecommunication could thus be a catalyst for further integration of Africa into the 
global economy.  In addition to support in the area of telecommunication, South Africa has 
assisted the DRC in institutional building for trade and industry, infrastructure development 
including major projects such as the Bas-Congo Corridor/Spatial Development Initiative, the 
Zambia Copper belt, the Inga Dam, telecommunications, technical assistance and expertise 
for electricity development and transport including airways.   
 
South Africa and the DRC signed an agreement on investments, a Memorandum of 
Understanding on trade and industry as well as a working group for ministers responsible for 
trade and industry, minerals, energy and transport in 2005 (DFA, 2005a). Here, the RSA-DRC 
Business Forum was launched. Cooperation and capacity building on customs and tax 
administration authorities, energy, mining, transport and agriculture was also discussed. As 
the fourth South Africa-DRC BNC was held in Kinshasa in August 2007 it was the first 
summit after the elections in 2006 and with the new democratically elected government, led 
by President Kabila, in place. Two months earlier President Kabila had visited President 
Mbeki in South Africa for bilateral talks (Government of South Africa, 2008: 263). Here 
Mbeki and Kabila reviewed the agreements in areas such as transport, telecommunications, 




and public services (Buanews, 2007). Agreements in the areas of health and infrastructure 
were signed, and South Africa also committed to finance construction of a new Airport 
terminal at N‟Djili airport, Kinshasa and a deep sea port at Banana (Buanews, 2007).  
 
The bilateral economic relations between South Africa and the DRC have made the latter 
evolve as one of South Africa‟s main trading partners in the region, according to the DFA 
(DFA 2005b; Government of South Africa, 2007b: 286). When Mbeki visited Kinshasa in 
2004 the Business Unity of South Africa signed a Cooperation Agreement with the DRC‟s 
Federation of entrepreneurial Chambers and the RSA-DRC business forum was launched 
(DFA 2005b). It is noteworthy how the economic relationship between South Africa and the 
DRC has evolved. In 1998 South African exports to the DRC were 1 048 465 000, whilst in 
2004 the number had increased to ZAR 1 387 566 000 (DFA, 2005b). In contrast, South 
African import from the DRC in 1998 was ZAR 25 042 000 and ZAR 1 343 217 000 in 2004. 
In 2008 exports from South Africa to the DRC were at ZAR 8 274 448 000 and imports from 
the DRC to South Africa at ZAR 49 977 000 (DIRCO, 2010). South Africa (DFA, 2005b) 
notes in 2005 that “The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have already begun 
working on economic reforms and assistance programmes, and certain confidence indicators 
make a compelling business case for investment and growth in the DRC”. Further, Minister 
Mandisi Mpahlwa expressed at the South Africa-DRC Business Forum in 2007 how “the 
South African business community has a very critical role to play in collaborating with the 
South African and DRC government to implement its bilateral economic strategy of achieving 
mutual economic growth and development with the continent through outward investment 
facilitation, infrastructure development and trade liberalisation” (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2007).  
 
As discussed in chapter three South Africa‟s own neo-liberal adoption post-apartheid raises 
questions due to its increasingly economic expansion into Africa, including in conflict areas. 
Despite the multiple challenges facing the DRC, Kabemba (2006; 2007: 549) argues that 
South Africa aims at creating “an environment favourable for corporate investment” based 
partly on own national interest, however “while seeking to ensure that this is not achieved at 
any potential costs to human rights, peace and security”. South Africa‟s involvement has 
received criticisms for paving way for South African business interests, and being a part of 




hand with good governance, democracy and economic growth (Kabemba, 2006: 152). 
Kagwanja (2006: 47; 2009: 23) describes the greatest lesson from the DRC as “the need to 
reconcile economic interests in a conflict zone with the imperatives of peacemaking”, 
underlining that despite the critique of South Africa‟s commercial and trade interest, South 
Africa‟s involvement and commitment transcends this and has a higher aim of stabilising the 
DRC through capacity and institution building. There is a great need for South Africa to 
rethink and clarify this role, in relation to its peacebuilding initiatives, as it is evident that 
South Africa is promoting an economic liberalisation in the DRC.  
4.4 African solutions based on a liberal agenda? 
 
An increasing part of the literature as well as empirical evidence underline how the limitations 
and contradictions of South Africa‟s foreign policy in the DRC and other multilateral 
initiatives must be recognised. Scholars such as Curtis (2007) and Ajulu (2008) argue that 
despite South Africa‟s committed engagement in the DRC the limitations of South Africa‟s 
“export of peace” must be emphasised. It is essential to recognise the complex challenges for 
a transition in the DRC, as post-conflict violence and tensions still act as an impediment for a 
stable Great Lakes region. Kagwanja (2006: 49) elaborates on issues such as “fundamental 
impediments facing the UN mission, namely inefficiency, inadequate resources and a limited 
mandate” make South Africa‟s contributions to the UN less effective. Critical analysts from a 
political economy perspective, such as Kabemba (2006: 154), explain the perpetuating 
conflict by looking at the external exploitation of the resources in the DRC which has taken 
place through colonialism and the post-colonial era. Such dynamics arguably have continued 
and are currently shaped as exploitative relationships of neo-colonial networks and patterns. 
On the other hand internal problems are impediments for the creation of a stable and 
legitimate state.  The political economy of conflict, weak leadership, the lack of state control 
over the eastern parts of the country and problems of reintegrating rebel groups into the 
dysfunctional army pose perpetuating challenges to the peace process (Kabemba, 2006: 155).  
Moreover, root causes such as the question of citizenship, land distribution and the regional 
aspect of the Great Lakes conflict, in a context of continuous exploitation by external and 





The potential for peaceful solutions by building a Congolese state through liberalisation of 
politics and economics in a noticeable top-down approach could be questioned, due to 
inherent contradictions within this liberal peacebuilding approach. Despite significant efforts 
in the DRC by the international community, including the UN peace mission, great challenges 
remain on the ground. The government has limited control of its territory outside Kinshasa, 
particularly prominent in the eastern parts of the country. There is a chronic lack of service 
delivery, and state institutions are weak and to some extent even dysfunctional. Corruption is 
widespread and political participation is far from satisfactory. The human rights situation is 
grave, and the humanitarian situation particularly in the east is far from the idea of an 
emancipatory peace. Kabemba (2006: 169) concludes how “the attainment of peace and 
stability in the DRC would owe much to the role that South Africa has played during the 
recent negotiations. Even if this has been guided by a mix of Mbeki‟s continental ambitions 
and the interest of South African capital in gaining secure and certain access to the riches of 
the DRC, the experience of democracy that South Africa has brought to the peace process 
may well prove to be invaluable to the long-term future of the DRC”. On the other hand, as 
South Africa itself highlights in its White Paper, elections in itself is no insurance for a 
peaceful prospering future.  
 
The remaining existing, and immense, challenges in the DRC, raise concern for the 
peacebuilding efforts taking place, and whether these create an environment conducive for 
long-lasting and emancipatory peace. Spence (2004) suggests that South Africa‟s approach to 
peacebuilding in the DRC is linked to a liberal and rational environment that necessarily does 
not suit all conflict environments, a view which is supported here. Linking the situation in the 
DRC back to the debate in the earlier chapters, Eriksen (2009) argues that the liberal peace 
agenda, in particular the attempt of state building, in the DRC has failed. “What is never 
questioned is the aim of creating a liberal state. Instead, this aim is treated as given, 
determined prior to and independent of the political process” (Eriksen, 2009: 16). The policies 
of western states are based on flawed ideas of creating a liberal state in the DRC. In 
accordance with the liberal peacebuilding critique Eriksen argues that external engagements 
have exacerbated the state weakness of the DRC, and further undermine the possibilities for 
building a liberal state as wanted by the donors (Eriksen, 2009: 17). Taylor (2007) goes 
further to argue how the liberal state is not applicable to the African context. Importantly, the 




and the social questions facing the country receives to a lesser degree focus on the ground, 
and on the local level. This coincides with Richmond (2008), Richmond and Franks (2009) 
and Autesserre‟s (2010) arguments that the local dynamics of peacebuilding is not sufficiently 
addressed in the top-down focussed liberal peacebuilding. The regional nature of the conflict 
further complicates the potential for change and creates a desire for searching solutions way 
beyond building a liberal state with its core seat in Kinshasa – which has little impact in large 
parts of the vast DRC.  
 
However, through a critical debate on the meaning of peace and the current liberal 
peacebuilding agenda, there is potential for the advancement of the discourse on current 
peacebuilding. Here, the emerging regional actors, such as South Africa, could represent a 
strong voice in searching for alternatives, in discourse and in practice. South Africa‟s 
committed engagement in the DRC, and the close relations between the two governments 
could pose a potential for an alternative approach towards more sustainable peace. On the 
other hand, South Africa‟s own neo-liberal adoption, despite its attempts of acting reformist 
in some international forums, could pose an obstacle for such debates, which would challenge 
the contemporary and more or less accepted liberal peacebuilding project. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
There is no question about South Africa‟s good intentions for supporting the DRC towards a 
more peaceful and stable future, despite accusations of neo-colonial intentions and national 
interest. As this chapter has illustrated, South Africa‟s engagement with the DRC has 
evidently changed from being a peacemaker to becoming a significant peacebuilding partner. 
South Africa‟s efforts in the DRC has been extensive and included a wide range of sectors, 
illustrating South Africa‟s push to help the DRC build a state through capacity and institution 
building. Through concerted efforts South Africa has become a significant partner in 
peacebuilding for the DRC in the transition period after the conflict and beyond. Progress in 
areas such as elections, humanitarian assistance and a relatively peaceful transition phase are 
not meant to be underestimated.  
 
However, the aim of this chapter was to investigate whether South Africa‟s peacebuilding 




project through a critical theory approach. Critical theory emphasise the contradictions of the 
liberal peacebuilding framework and practice. Merging the peacebuilding and statebuilding 
project poses great challenges when searching for a solution for long-term sustainable peace. 
 
There are few evidences that South Africa is promoting a peace which is different from the 
liberal peace. The nexus of peace and development is overshadowed by the aim of building a 
Congolese liberal state. Throughout this chapter it has become evident that South Africa to a 
large extent has built its engagement in the DRC on the structures of liberalism, executed in 
an environment where the liberal state is a goal of its peacebuilding activities. Peace itself 
becomes secondary and compromised to the construction of a liberal state. It would be 
expected for South Africa to support the international mechanisms such as UN peace 
operations to some extent. However these findings are also evident in South Africa‟s bilateral 
engagement in the DRC. Despite the rhetoric of finding African solutions to African problems 
and searching for an African Renaissance also through a successful development of the DRC, 
the peacebuilding approach in the DRC is evidently taking place in a liberal environment, in 
accordance with the liberal peacebuilding agenda promoted by the international community. 
Instead of searching for applicable solutions to African conflicts such as in the DRC, the aim 




5  Building a liberal peace? 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa, as one of the leading political and economic powers in Africa, 
has received great expectations for playing a significant role in developing a peaceful and 
prosperous Africa. South Africa has also received a lot of recognition for its attempts at 
creating or strengthening institutions for Africa‟s development, such as the AU, NEPAD and 
SADC. Its efforts in peacemaking as well as peacebuilding illustrate the deep commitment to 
lifting its continent out of poverty and conflict. On the other hand, as Shillinger (2009), 
Southall (2006) and others highlight, there is a question mark behind describing South Africa 
as “Africa‟s peacemaker”. Through scholarly and empirical critiques of South Africa‟s bona 
fides in its backyard, it becomes clear how South Africa‟s engagement on the continent is 
disputed, complex and multifaceted.  
By drawing on critical theory this study has raised a number of questions and issues about 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in Africa, by specifically looking at its engagement in the 
DRC from 2003 to 2008.  However, this study was not motivated by critiquing South Africa‟s 
extensive efforts in peacebuilding. It was motivated by the critique of the current liberal 
peacebuilding project which takes place in troubled areas of the world. The framework and 
practice of the liberal peacebuilding, through a combination of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding, have inherent contradictions, which might represent obstacles for long-term 
sustainable peace. Critical theory challenges the contemporary liberal peacebuilding project, 
with the aim of opening up the discussion of peacebuilding, in theory and practice.  
This study aimed at establishing whether South Africa, as a regional actor, promotes a liberal 
peacebuilding, or whether the idea of African solutions to African problems represents a 
different roadmap to peace. This study has critically challenged the theoretical foundations of 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement, through identifying assumptions about the 
applicability of the current liberal peacebuilding project and unveiling its inherent 
contradictions. There are few findings indicating that South Africa‟s approach to 
peacebuilding is diverging from the “liberal peacebuilding consensus”, despite its attempt at 




This chapter will bring together the analysis and some of the core findings from the four 
preceding chapters. It will highlight the most important contradictions in South Africa‟s 
peacebuilding role guided by critical theory, as this study has established that South Africa is 
seemingly promoting a liberal peace approach to its peacebuilding endeavours in the DRC. 
The explanatory value of critical theory and the significance this method brings to the table 
will be revisited. Further, this chapter will summarise the contributions that this study has 
provided to the field of IR and particularly regarding peacebuilding. The chapter will also 
contribute with some policy recommendations and suggest directions for further research. 
 
5.2 Summary of findings  
 
Chapter one sets the context and motivation for this study, focusing on the critique against the 
current peacebuilding project as well as the emergence of non-traditional actors in 
peacebuilding. South Africa has marked itself as an important actor in promoting peace and 
development in Africa, through negotiation and peacemaking and increasingly as a partner in 
complex peace operations and peacebuilding. South Africa‟s engagement in the DRC has 
been particularly prominent, due to its extensive cooperation in numerous sectors beyond the 
peace agreement and transitional phase. This first chapter highlighted how the literature on 
South Africa‟s role as an agent of peace is extensive. However, such studies are often 
descriptive in nature and largely concern the era before the peace agreement in the DRC, or 
the period up to the 2006 elections. Moreover, few of these studies have been placed within a 
critical theory framework on a theoretical level. Critical theory has an explanatory value that 
more orthodox theories cannot provide as it has a post-positivist methodology which 
challenges the current ontology and epistemology in IR. By globalising IR and including 
actors such as regional actors, critical theory opens up for a movement towards an inclusive 
approach to peacebuilding, incorporating new actors and elements such as emancipation. This 
chapter has clarified the significance that this study, through critical theory, and using the case 
study of South Africa‟s peacebuilding engagement in the DRC, contributes to, in theory as 
well as in practice. 
Chapter two provided the theoretical debate on contemporary peacebuilding.  It presented 




peacebuilding as providing structures and a certain environment for peace. The contemporary 
understanding of peacebuilding in orthodox theories is that peace is to be built on structures 
such as democracy, rule of law, political and economic liberalisation within a clear liberal 
environment – namely the liberal peacebuilding. However, by utilising critical theory and its 
method, the critique against the liberal peacebuilding project and its limitations opens up for 
many questions. Challenging the methodological and epistemological limitations of the 
contemporary peacebuilding project it becomes clear how it is built on Western assumptions 
and liberal understandings of what peace is and how peace is to be achieved. Moreover, this 
chapter has discussed the inherent contradictions of the liberal peacebuilding, and how 
contemporary understandings of peacebuilding itself could be an impediment for sustainable 
peace. The political objective of peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War has 
been to build liberal states (Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005). Additionally, the chapter has 
touched upon the current debate on alternatives to the liberal peacebuilding. There is a great 
need for further advancement of the reflections and practice of current peacebuilding 
approaches. 
In chapter three the theoretical framework from chapter two was utilised in order to search for 
the foundations which guides South Africa‟s engagement in peacebuilding on the African 
continent. The chapter explored South Africa‟s strategy for peacebuilding and found that 
there are few evidences, both in its own strategy and statements as well as in its strong 
support of the NEPAD strategy and the African Renaissance, suggesting that South Africa‟s 
approach to peacebuilding is different from the current peacebuilding consensus. South 
Africa, despite being vocal about African solutions to African problems, has to a strong 
degree adopted the liberal peacebuilding agenda. 
Chapter four has applied the theoretical foundations, and built on findings from chapter three, 
to the case study of South Africa‟s peacebuilding role in the DRC 2003-2008. Through a 
careful analysis the chapter focused on South African policy and practice in its peacebuilding 
engagements in the DRC. In line with chapter three, there is little evidence to support that 
South Africa has an approach which diverges from the international community‟s liberal 
peacebuilding approach. South Africa, despite President Mbeki being particularly vocal on 
promoting African solutions to African problems, and despite using its own experience in 
other conflict areas, is seemingly not showing a significant potential to challenge 




supporting international initiatives through multilateral channels such as the UN mission, as 
could be expected. However, there are also strong indications on how South Africa, through 
its bilateral engagement, is closely engaged in creating a state based on liberal institutions. 
South Africa‟s initiatives in the areas of democratisation, rule of law and economic 
liberalisation to a great extent supports the liberal peacebuilding project. These are liberal 
structures shaped in a liberal environment. 
Despite the rhetoric on African solutions to African problems and the African Renaissance 
South Africa‟s approach in the DRC shows liberal in nature, which again has inherent 
contradictions which might be an impediment for long-term sustainable peace also in the 
DRC. As the conflict in the DRC is still ongoing in the eastern parts of the country, close to a 
decade after the peace agreement and five years after the first democratic election since 
independence, this is a strong indicator that the root causes of the conflict have not been 
addressed in an effective manner. Security sector reform in the country is not effective or 
successful, and the government in Kinshasa still has limited control of its territory outside the 
capital. Thus, South Africa‟s approach to peacebuilding in the DRC is arguably a problem-
solving approach which has contributed with limited change and not necessarily laid the 




5.3 A potential for an alternative peacebuilding? 
 
This study has opened up for further discussions about the contemporary peacebuilding 
project, its foundations and its potential for long-term sustainable peace. Many critical 
questions have been raised. A post-positivist method and critical theory challenges 
theoretical, conceptual and empirical foundations of IR and not all the questions raised have 
been meant to be answered. Critical theory does not aim to conclude with set answers that are 
globally applicable. Rather, the questions asked are meant to challenge the basis of the 
existing power relations in world politics and discourse. Challenging the ontology and 
epistemology of IR, and here the contradictions of the liberal peacebuilding framework and its 
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practice, contributes to advancing the analysis of contemporary understandings and practice 
of peacebuilding - however without presenting conclusive truths or ideal and universal 
solutions. As part of critical theory, these questions illustrate how all these issues deserve 
more attention in the search for a peaceful and prosperous world for all its citizens. 
It has been highlighted through this study that it is not the intentions of peacebuilding which 
needs critique. Rather, it is the assumptions about what kind of peace that is to be built that 
needs further analysis, in theory and practice. The conceptual framework for the liberal peace 
has emerged through a complex evolution with a particular conceptualisation and 
methodological environment for understanding peace, namely a liberal environment, or 
historical context. The liberal peace, which is to arise through building a liberal state founded 
on liberal institutions, has shown limited success in different conflict areas of the world. The 
assumptions of the universal applicability of such states are often not compatible with the 
situation in conflict areas (Eriksen, 2009: 15). Also, building a liberal state overshadows the 
initial aim of such operations, namely finding long-term sustainable peace. One of the 
uncomfortable compromises of liberal peacebuilding is using peacebuilding to legitimate 
statebuilding (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 182). The DRC is one obvious case. Clarification 
of the environment in which peacebuilding takes place, currently a liberal environment, 
unveils what peacebuilding actually promotes and the effects it has on the ground. By opening 
up for a critical discourse on peacebuilding a potential for a true globalisation of the discourse 
and practice of peacebuilding arises. The discontinuity between the objective of peacebuilding 
and its actual impact should thus be discussed further. A more thorough engagement with 
critical theory would be beneficial for future theorising about and even more importantly, for 
the practice of peacebuilding. 
One of the core contributions from the critical theory tradition is identifying possibilities for 
change, in this study to search for an emancipatory peace. A problem-solving approach in 
itself will not provide the kind of change that would lead to an emancipatory sustainable 
peace. However, it has not been the aim of this study to reject the current peacebuilding 
projects in conflict areas and the extensive efforts of the international community, NGOs, 
donors and regional actors. The hypothesis in this study, namely if South Africa is building a 
liberal peace in the DRC, is rather meant as a contribution to advancing the discourse and 
practice of peacebuilding. As touched upon particularly in chapter two there is a need to work 




peacebuilding project must be the lessons learnt for searching for alternative approaches. 
Moreover, connecting theory and practice will be absolutely necessary in the search for more 
sustainable and locally grounded approaches. This poses a critical need for further research, 
also by looking at the UN Peacebuilding Commission‟s role. 
The liberal peacebuilding, namely the merging of peacebuilding and statebuilding, legitimises 
contemporary peacebuilding practices which are top-down and externally driven (Richmond 
and Franks, 2009: 181). This top-down approach has undermined the legitimacy of the liberal 
peacebuilding project. The gaps between finding peace and building states must be re-
addressed. The search for a hybrid form of peacebuilding and statebuilding “that can develop 
international approaches and consensus for peace, while also developing and assisting the 
localised dynamics for peace” is necessary (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 183). In this process 
localised dynamics and emancipation must be placed higher on the practical agenda. There is 
an urgent need to focus on political agency for individuals, rather than institutions as the main 
priority. It is peace that needs to be the main focus, not the creation of the structures for a 
liberal state. Reflections on the liberal state itself and its questionable applicability, 
particularly to troubled areas in the world, are necessary in order to avoid what caused war in 
the first place. 
It should be noticed that because the liberal peace is seen as the only solution to contemporary 
conflict and the empirical evidence of its shortcomings, there is a great need to evaluate the 
liberal peacebuilding approach, and the potential such an approach has for sustainable long-
lasting peace (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 185). This study does not aim at giving an answer 
to a specific alternative peacebuilding. It would be up to analysts and policy makers to come 
up with plausible alternatives to the current liberal peacebuilding project. There will be no 
easy answers or quick fixes to intractable conflicts. However such situations underline the 
need to address the inherent contradictions of current peacebuilding. One must look at the 
enormous resources put into current peacebuilding projects and analyse these in relation to the 
results on the ground, or lack thereof. This is where critical theory has a great potential for a 
modification and alternation of current peacebuilding approaches, particularly when 
addressing the wide agenda of peacebuilding, and the higher aim of creating long-lasting 
sustainable, an emancipatory, peace. There is a huge potential for more critical reflection as 
well as more critical practical politics by policy makers, donors, the UN, the AU, SADC, 




5.4 The role of regional actors 
 
Beyond challenging contemporary understandings of peacebuilding this study has provided 
another aspect to the debate, namely the role of regional actors in peacebuilding. The critical 
theory motivation is whether such approaches can challenge the ontology and epistemology of 
the current peacebuilding discourse and reveal new aspects of actors in peacebuilding. Could 
leading regional actors potentially represent an alternative approach to peacebuilding, as they 
might have a better starting point for understanding the complex conflicts in their own 
regions, or as they might represent views from the South as opposed to the liberal orthodoxy? 
South Africa has shown a vast commitment to peace and development in Africa after the end 
of apartheid as this study has illustrated. South Africa has been a vital actor in many 
peacemaking processes and beyond and has shown muscle as an agent of peace despite 
fighting its own struggles at home. The emergence of regional actors in peacebuilding could 
potentially contribute with more critical views challenging contemporary peacebuilding and 
further unveiling alternatives for peacebuilding. South Africa through its White Paper 
underlines several of the weaknesses of the liberal peacebuilding approach, such as a lack of 
building on local capacities and the lack of addressing root causes.  
On the other hand it does not seem as such elements have received significant attention in 
South Africa‟s peacebuilding approach on the ground. Despite such mediation efforts, the 
contradictions in South Africa‟s peacebuilding approach, such as the unclear strategy and 
outcome of the nexus of economic interests and political priorities in conflict areas, is also 
recognisable in existing literature on South Africa‟s foreign policy role in general, as 
addressed in chapter one. Kagwanja (2009: 31) points to how “South Africa should revisit its 
multilateral policy to see whether it is the best vehicle for its African policy”.  South Africa‟s 
increasing economic engagement in the DRC, also post-Mbeki, is a topic which deserves 
further critical analysis. Recent indications of the close relations between current South 
African President Zuma and the DRC government make it timely to look deeper into the 
foundations for South Africa‟s relations with the DRC. For example, close relatives to 
President Zuma, who are deeply embedded in business, have allegedly received deals on 
access to oil exploration in the DRC. Such contradictions in South Africa‟s relations to the 




makers to look at, and foremost an issue for the South African government to clarify. 
Landsberg (s.a.: 28) argues how South Africa should sensitise its private sector to play a 
developmental role in its region, and not follow the exploitative means of many multinational 
companies. However, the question then remains to exactly what kind of developmental role 
South Africa wishes to have and moreover, which outcomes of its peacebuilding endeavours 
are the most imperative. 
The potential of such actors deserves further focus both in theory as well as in practice, not 
just in the more orthodox area of the global economy as seen increasingly in the later years, 
but also in the area of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Developing and refining existing 
frameworks and typologies of regional power theory needs further attention, particularly with 
regards to frameworks suitable for analysing regional actors in their efforts for peace and 
development in their neighbourhoods. By looking at regional actors in peace efforts, 
particularly in a comparative view, which could also be done across continents, one could 
possibly yield valuable knowledge of understanding such actors‟ engagements. Here, the 
utilisation of critical theory ensures going beyond assumptions about peacebuilding and 
incorporating the foundations underlying such engagements. Here the potential for possibly 
identifying sources of change for a long-lasting sustainable, emancipatory, peace arises. A 
multiple case study design could also advance findings of such studies and add to the large 
and debated field of regional powers – and to the theory and practice of peacebuilding. 
Importantly, studies from the South pose a great potential to move the discourse, and policy, 
ahead. Revisiting Taylor‟s (2007) argument, there is a great question mark behind what 
peacebuilding framework would be suitable for the African context. African scholars and 
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